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Abstract
We explore the nature of Business Groups, that is network-like forms of hierarchical organization
between legally autonomous rms spanning both within and across national borders. Exploiting
a unique dataset of 270,474 headquarters controlling more than 1,500,000 (domestic and foreign)
a¢ liates in all countries worldwide, we nd that business groups account for a signicant part of
value-added generation in both developed and developing countries, with a prevalence in the lat-
ter. In order to characterize their boundaries, we distinguish between an a¢ liate vs. a group-level
index of vertical integration, as well as an entropy-like metric able to summarize the hierarchical
complexity of a group and its trade-o¤ between exploitation of knowledge as an input across the
hierarchy and the associated communication costs. We relate these metrics to host country institu-
tional characteristics, as well as to the performance of a¢ liates across business groups. Conditional
on institutional quality, a negative correlation exists between vertical integration and hierarchical
complexity in dening the boundaries of business groups. We also nd a robust (albeit non-linear)
positive relationship between a groups hierarchical complexity and productivity which dominates
the already known correlation between vertical integration and productivity. Results are in line
with the theoretical framework of knowledge-based hierarchies developed by the literature, in which
intangible assets are a complementary input in the production processes.
JEL classication: L22; L23; F23; L25; D24, G34
Keywords: production chains, hierarchies, business groups, property rights, nancial develop-
ment, contract enforcement, vertical integration, corporate ownership, organization of production,
productivity.
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Non-Technical Summary
The emergence of Business Groups is traditionally considered a phenomenon typical of countries
at an early stage of development, where rms with a formally autonomous legal status are put under
a common and coordinated management in order to circumvent imperfections on inputs or credit
markets. Moreover, a well documented literature provides evidence of their importance in the early
history of industrialized nations. Nonetheless, in an economic environment in which Global Value
Chains are becoming increasingly important in shaping trade and production ows internationally,
we nd that these organizational forms are very common across di¤erent economic and institutional
environments, in both developing and developed economies, accounting for a lions share of world
value added. In fact, under our general denition, also multinational enterprises can be considered
as Business Groups, since one of their distinctive features is to organize legally autonomous a¢ liates
spanning across di¤erent countries under the common management of unique headquarters.
In order to characterize the phenomenon of (domestic and multinational) Business Groups, in this
paper we map at the rm-level 270,374 headquarters controlling 1,519,588 a¢ liates in 2010, across
more than 200 countries and all industries, for a total of (unconsolidated) value added of some 28 US$
trillion. Two thirds of our BGs are originated in OECD economies, whose headquarters own about 76%
of a¢ liates worldwide. The ratio of foreign to domestic a¢ liates is smaller for groups originating from
developing countries (around .3), since these countries have a relatively larger proportion of rms
organized as domestic business groups, while the ratio is highest for the US (.85), where Business
Group structures tend to operate abroad rather than domestically.
We embed Business Groups in the property rights theory of the rm, considering them as hybrid
organizations of economic activities, halfway between markets and hierarchies. Under this lens, we nd
that a distinctive characteristic of a Business Group is that it provides at the same time incentives to
self-enforce promises of cooperation among units of production, given the control exerted by a common
parent, without giving up the advantage (if and when necessary) of organizing activities within a
market-like environment, since each a¢ liate maintains formal property rights on its production assets.
Combining insights from di¤erent strands of literature, we provide novel metrics able to assess
the vertical integration of these structures at both the a¢ liate and the group-level. We then comple-
ment those metrics with a specic entropy-like measure of organizational complexity of hierarchical
chains adapted from graph theory, which proxies the di¤erent costs of acquiring and communicating
knowledge throughout the hierarchy.
Consistently with the property rights theory of the rm, we nd that better institutions lead to
less vertical integration, both at the group and at the a¢ liate level. Moreover, Business Groups that
have a high internal degree of vertical integration (between headquarters and a¢ liates) also tend
to have relatively unspecialized (more integrated) a¢ liates. Interestingly, the a¢ liate and its group
are at the margin less similar in terms of vertical integration in good institutional environments,
as a higher contract enforcement and/or a better nancial development allow the single a¢ liate to
specialize more, exchanging fewer inputs with coa¢ liates and the parent. Moreover, conditional on
the quality of institutions, a negative correlation arises between vertical integration and organizational
complexity: for a given level of nancial development, more specialized (less integrated) a¢ liates end
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up within more complex organizational structures.
We also nd that the positive relationship between vertical integration and a¢ liatesproductivity
emerging in our data is not robust to the inclusion of a groups organizational complexity, thus
providing yet another piece of evidence on the importance of considering jointly vertical integration
and organizational complexity decisions in assessing Business Groups. The result is consistent with
recent insights of organizational economics who models rms as knowledge-based hierarchies where
knowledge is a typical intangible and costly input complementary to physical inputs in production
processes: since best intangible assets (such as best managers, best managerial practices) can be
shared in presence of a larger number of units of production (in our case more complex hierarchies),
their cost can be smoothed on a larger scale leading to a higher individual a¢ liatesproductivity.
The relevance of intangible assets is also conrmed by the fact that the relationship between
organizational complexity and productivity is non-linear: above a certain threshold of complexity
(around 550 a¢ liates and/or 5 levels of control) the relationship becomes negative. This result is in line
with the idea that a minimum e¢ cient scale exists in the acquisition and communication of knowledge
throughout the hierarchy, associated however to the emergence of endogenous communication costs of
additional management layers, which should increase with complexity. Such an evidence of marginally
decreasing returns from increasing complexity is relevant, as it puts a natural limit to the growth in
complexity of business groups: indeed, only 1% of groups in our sample exceed this average optimal
organizational threshold
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1 Introduction
"The economics literature has not had much to say about non-standard organizational forms [...] now much discussed in
the business and organizational literatures, including joint ventures, strategic alliances, networks, business groups, clans,
and virtual organizations". [Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002]
The emergence of Business Groups (BGs) is traditionally considered a phenomenon typical of
countries at an early stage of development: in order to circumvent market imperfections, rms with
a formally autonomous legal status are put under a common control exerted by a parent entity, in
a network-like hierarchical organization of economic activities1. And yet, the benets of such an
organizational form seem to be extensively seized by modern economies. After a cursory glance at
the data, most of the Fortune 500 companies, the top 2,000 R&D rms listed by the Industrial R&D
Investment Scoreboard (IRI, 2011), as well as the top 100 largest multinational enterprises listed by
UNCTAD (2011) can be included under the category of domestic or cross-border Business Group: these
companies are in fact organized under headquarters controlling hierarchies of a¢ liates incorporated
in their domestic market and/or abroad.2 For example, the top 100 corporations listed by UNCTAD
have an average of 625 a¢ liates each, located with roughly equal proportions both domestically and
abroad (on average in 64 countries), with up to 10 di¤erent hierarchical levels of control.
In terms of trade ows, a reading of the US BEA (2012) data along the dimension of Business
Groups reveals that at least 75% of total US trade can be linked to rms organized as multinational
BGs.3 A similar exercise for France, where transaction- and rm-level data have been matched to the
ownership structure of companies, reveals that some 65% of total French imports or exports can be
attributed to rms (domestic or foreign-owned) that are part of a Business Group structure (Altomonte
et al., 2012).
However, while a large part of economic activity and trade can be attributed to rms organized as
Business Groups, these organizational forms have been relatively neglected in the economic literature,
where usually the focus has been on either individual rmschoices of vertical integration or, more
recently, on the within-rm organizational design for the transmission of management decisions. In
this contribution we try to ll this gap, by characterizing the presence of BGs across developing
and developed countries and across industries, and by showing how, within BGs, vertical integration
choices are not independent from the hierarchical organization of production units along the command
chain.
To that extent, we capitalize on a unique dataset that we have built, able to map 270,374 head-
1Across geography and time, the di¤erent notions of chaebol in South Korea, keiretsu in Japan, konzerne in Germany
all make reference to the idea of clusters of rms under common control. Khanna and Yafeh (2007) provide a survey of
Business Groupspresence in emerging countries. Jones and Colpan (2010) or Fruin (2008) explore their importance in
the early history of industrialized nations.
2 In a domestic Business Group, a¢ liates are all located within the same country of the headquarter, while a cross-
border Business Group corresponds to the case of a multinational company.
3The US BEA (2012) reports that in 2009 foreign a¢ liates located in the United States accounted for 20.8 percent of
the countrys exports and 31.1 percent of imports of goods. At the same time, U.S. exports of goods associated to US
multinationals were 54.7 percent of total exports of goods, while the similar gure for imports was 45.1 percent. As a
result, 75.5 percent of total U.S. exports and 76.2 percent of total U.S. imports of goods in 2009 can be considered as
Business-Group related.
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quarters controlling 1,519,588 a¢ liates worldwide in 2010, across all industries.4 Two thirds of our
BGs are originated in OECD economies, whose headquarters control about 76% of a¢ liates worldwide.
The ratio of foreign to domestic a¢ liates is smaller for groups originating from developing countries
(around .26, i.e. one foreign a¢ liate each four domestic ones on average), since these countries have
a relatively larger proportion of rms organized as domestic business groups (Khanna and Yafeh,
2007).5 The ratio is instead highest for the US (.85), where in particular 32% of Business Groups are
only domestic, 24% are only cross-border with all a¢ liates abroad, while 44% tend to operate both
domestically and abroad.
As we have individual balance sheet data for (most of) these rms, we are able to recover a
total (unconsolidated) value added accruable to Business Groups of some 27.9 US$ trillion. We nd
that very simple Business Group structures (with one headquarter and one a¢ liate, located either
domestically or abroad) represent 57% of our groups, but account for only 1% of the total value
added in our data. On the contrary, around 2,000 of the largest BGs (headquarters with more than
100 a¢ liates, both domestic and cross-border) constitute less than 1% of groups in our sample but
account for 72% of the total value-added measured in the data. In the US, these large mixed groups
operating both domestically and abroad report a value added equal to 83% of the total US value-added
recorded in the sample.
From this cursory glance at the data, it then follows that a large part of economic activity is
undertaken under organizational forms in which it might exist a correlation between the decision
on vertical integration (make or buy) and the hierarchical organization of production (the design of
the command chain, which becomes relevant when at least two a¢ liates are controlled by the same
headquarter). In this paper we show that ignoring the latter correlation can lead to a number of
omitted variable biases in the analysis of the organization of the rm.
To explore more formally these issues, it is appropriate to nest Business Groups within the property
rights theory of the rm by considering Business Groups as entities that organize a number of formally
independent rms under a common hierarchy, in order to provide at the same time incentives to self-
enforce promises of cooperation among units of production (given the control exerted by a common
parent), without giving up the advantage, if and when necessary, of organizing activities within a
market-like environment (since each a¢ liate maintains formal property rights on its production assets).
The theory of the rm has been relatively silent on these organizational forms, with most au-
thors implicitly assuming that rms could be epitomized through a two-dimensional decision problem
(Helpman, 2008): whether to source intermediate inputs from within the rm or not, i.e. the vertical
integration decision; and whether to locate an economic activity in the country of origin or abroad,
i.e. the o¤shoring decision.6 A common nding of this literature is that rm boundaries depend on
4Our primary source of data is ORBIS, a global dataset containing detailed balance sheet information for some 100
million companies worldwide. In addition, the database contains information on over 30 million shareholder/subsidiary
links, that we have been able to organize across each rm. The database has been signicantly expanded since 2009,
with a better coverage of countries traditionally not well mapped such as Japan and the United States. More detailed
information on the dataset, as well as its validation across countries, is discussed in Section 2.
5This nding is generally consistent with the idea that the boundaries of the rm should be larger in the presence of
a poor institutional environment and thus higher transaction costs.
6The vertical integration decision has been explored by a vast literature modelling incomplete contracts and rm
boundaries, based on the seminal works of Williamson (1971, 1975, 1985), Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and
Moore (1990). For some surveys, see Holmstrom and Tirole (1989), Whinston (2001), Joskow (2005), Helpman (2006),
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institutional frictions. In particular, Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009) are the rst to empiri-
cally investigate the combined impact of nancial and contracting institutions on vertical integration
decisions, nding vertical integration to be positively correlated with the interaction term between con-
tracting institutions and nancial frictions. From a slightly di¤erent perspective, Alfaro et al. (2011)
nd that similar levels of protectionism, hence trade institutions, imply also similar levels of vertical
integration. Alfaro and Charlton (2009) investigate vertical FDI activities and nd that these are
not explained by host countriescomparative advantages, as a¢ liates tend to be rather proximate to
parents both in vertical integration and skill content. Nunn (2007) or Nunn and Treer (2008) provide
instead an empirical support for the main tenets of the literature on the o¤shoring decision, relating
the contracting environment of a suppliers inputs to the share of US imports that are intra-rm.
In a rst attempt to broaden the scope of the property rights approach, Hart and Holstrom (2010)
develop a theoretical model in which assetsownership implies non-contractible management decisions,
thus shifting the focus of the previous literature from the analysis of incentives for relationship-specic
investments to the organization of management decisions. In a complementary approach, Garicano
(2000), Garicano and Hubbard (2007) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004, 2006, 2012) directly
model rms as knowledge-based hierarchies, where coordinated management decisions are taken on the
basis of the available knowledge, considered as an intangible and costly input which is complementary
to physical inputs in production processes. In their theoretical framework an organizational structure
is hence endogenous and dependent on the costs of acquiring and communicating knowledge among
agents involved with di¤erent tasks within the rm hierarchy.
Related to this literature, Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) empirically nd that exporting
rms increase the number of layers of management as a result of trade liberalization, with a more
complex organizational design implying a higher rm productivity. A relationship between organiza-
tion and productivity is also present in Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012), who nd that rms
headquartered in high-trust countries are also the ones that are more likely to decentralize decisions,
eventually showing higher aggregate productivity thanks to a better reallocation of resources. Country
studies for India and US in Bloom at al. (2013) and Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012) conrmed
the latter.
All these papers do not however consider the peculiarities of a Business Group, in which vertical
integration choices are not necessarily independent from the hierarchical organization of production
units along the command chain.7 Consider for example the case of two ex-ante similar Business Groups
present in our dataset: General Motors and Mitsubishi. Both groups have a century-old tradition in the
production of motor vehicles in their own country of origin (the US and Japan). Moreover, in 2010 our
data report that these two groups have a similar size, as they control 659 and 652 a¢ liates in 54 and 32
countries, respectively.8 Still, when looking at industrial activities beyond motor vehicles, Mitsubishi
Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg (2009), Aghion and Holden (2011). The o¤shoring decision, instead, has been theoretically
studied among others by Grossman and Helpman (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005), Antràs (2003), Antràs and Helpman (2004,
2008).
7The only attempt we have found to explicitely model a theory of business networks is in Kali (1999; 2003). However,
also in his approach Business Groups are the result of either a limited contract enforcement or imperfect capital markets,
with their nature thus essentially reconducted to the dualnature of rm boundaries, without mentioning the implications
of rmshierarchies. Alternatively, the issue has been considered as yet another aspect of rmssize in the nance literature
(Acharya, Myers and Rajan, 2011; Rajan and Zingales, 2001a, 2001b; Kumar, Rajan and Zingales, 1999).
8Alfaro and Charlton (2009) also recall the GM case and enlist 2,248 entities belonging to the GM network in
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is involved in some ten lines of business (e.g. electronic products, aircraft, shipbuilding, petroleum
products, chemical products, primary metals, food & beverages, bank and insurance, real estate), while
GM beyond motor vehicles provides only nancial services for its customers. Accordingly, the a¢ liates
of Mitsubishi are able to provide a wider range of intermediate inputs to the group, with rms typically
operating in 3 or 4 main di¤erent industries, whereas the a¢ liates of General Motors seem relatively
more focused on one or two main intermediate activities. As a result, the degree of vertical integration
is higher for Mitsubishi than GM. Crucially, however, Mitsubishi is signicantly less complex in terms
of organization, with a much atter hierarchical structure (with no more than 3 levels of hierarchy
within the group), while GM is characterized by a deeper (up to 8 levels) and more complex hierarchy
of cross-participations in its a¢ liates. Moreover, we also nd that the labor productivity of a¢ liates
belonging to the hierarchically more complex GM group is on average signicantly larger than the one
of Mitsubishis a¢ liates.
The latter evidence, showing that vertical integration choices are not independent from decisions on
the organization of the hierarchy of rms across groups, is systematic and statistically signicant across
our sample once we control for institutional characteristics of the host countries. Also, the nding
that higher levels of complexity in hierarchies, rather than vertical integration levels, are positively
associated with the average productivity of a¢ liates operating within a given group (controlling for
the location and the main activity of a¢ liates and headquarters) is systematic in our data.
Building on these preliminary insights, we construct three novel metrics to catch the multidi-
mensionality of BGs and derive from them a number of results, conrming the idea that vertical
integration choices are not independent from the hierarchical design of organizations in shaping up
Business Groups and their performance.
By nesting an Input-Output matrix that is specic for each group structure, we rst rene the
notion of vertical integration propensity found in Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009) in order to
distinguish between a group- and an a¢ liate-level propensity to exchange intermediate goods. We nd
the distinction between vertical integration at the a¢ liate and at the group-level to be relevant in our
data, as it allows for a better identication of the relationship between institutional characteristics and
vertical integration measures. The intuition here is that estimating vertical integration in a sample
of rms in which each BGs a¢ liate is considered as an independent rm, as the literature has done
insofar, would miss the structural correlation in vertical integration linking a¢ liates of the same group,
thus generating potentially biased results. Consistently with the property rights theory of the rm,
we nd that better institutions lead to less vertical integration, both at the group and at the a¢ liate
level. Moreover, BGs that have a high internal degree of vertical integration (between headquarters
and a¢ liates) also tend to have relatively unspecialized (more integrated) a¢ liates. Interestingly, the
a¢ liate and its group are at the margin less similar in terms of vertical integration in goodinstitu-
tional environments, as a higher contract enforcement and/or a better nancial development allow the
single a¢ liate to specialize more, exchanging fewer inputs with coa¢ liates and the parent. Moreover,
1999, making however no di¤erence between a¢ liates/subsidiaries and branches/divisions as we do (see infra). However
some major events have occurred to GM since 1999. In 2005 the group conclusively sold its participations in electronics
production (Hughes Electronics, Electro-Motive) and in 2006 left to Toyota the control of Subaru, Suzuki and Isuzu.
As a consequence of the industrial restructuring undertaken in 2009, GM has given up production of some brands (e.g.
Pontiac, Oldsmobile) and the European division has almost completely dissolved, leaving only Opel in Germany in charge
of the remaining activities.
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conditional on the quality of institutions, a negative correlation arises between vertical integration and
hierarchical complexity: for a given level of nancial development, more specialized (less integrated)
a¢ liates end up within more complex organizational structures. Contractual enforcement yields a
similar trade-o¤, but less robust.
Furthermore, relying more specically on the literature on organization and hierarchies, we develop
a measure of hierarchical complexity applicable to any hierarchical organization (including Business
Groups), which is consistent with the previously quoted theoretical models of knowledge-based hier-
archies, where a trade-o¤ can arise between the exploitation of knowledge as an intangible input and
its communication along the hierarchy. The measure is retrieved as a variation of the node entropy
of a hierarchical graph, and is continuous and additive in the number of levels. In our sample the
measure is also Pareto-distributed across groups, in line with the previously mentioned concentration
of economic activity in the largest (and organizationally more complex) groups.
In relating these metrics to the productivity of a¢ liates belonging to Business Groups, always
controlling for country and industry xed e¤ects, we nd a positive relationship between vertical inte-
gration and a¢ liatesproductivity that however is not robust to the inclusion of a groups hierarchical
complexity, with only the latter remaining signicantly associated to productivity. This result com-
plements the ndings of Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson (2012) in the case of US rms, where much
of the correlation between a rms performance and its vertical structure fades away when controlling
for a generic measure of rm size. The result is also consistent with the theoretical rationale provided
by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Garicano and Hubbard (2007), according to which best
intangible assets (such as best managers, best managerial practices) can be shared in presence of a
larger number of units of production (in our case more complex hierarchies) and hence their cost can
be smoothed on a larger scale.9
The relevance of intangible assets is also conrmed by the fact that we nd the relationship between
hierarchical complexity and productivity to be non-linear: above a certain threshold of complexity
(around 550 a¢ liates and/or 5 levels of control) the relationship becomes negative. This result is in
line with the microfoundation provided by Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), in which a minimum
e¢ cient scale exists in the acquisition and communication of knowledge throughout the hierarchy,
associated however to the emergence of endogenous communication costs of additional management
layers, which should increase with complexity. Such an evidence of marginally decreasing returns from
increasing complexity is relevant, as it puts a natural limit to the growth in complexity of Business
Groups: indeed, only 1% of groups in our sample exceed this average optimalorganizational threshold.
When distinguishing between hierarchical complexity (which takes into account the overall density
of a¢ liates at each level of the control hierarchy) and the simple hierarchical distance, i.e. the length
of the command chain linking each a¢ liate to the parent company, we nd that the further the rm
is from the decision making center, the lower its level of productivity appears to be; however, the
latter result only holds when we control for our main measure of hierarchical complexity. When
considering only hierarchical distance in the model (itself a raw proxy of hierarchical complexity),
9Under the assumption that a higher number of layers of controls from the headquarters to the a¢ liates can be
considered as a proxy for the delegation of authority, our positive correlation between hierarchical complexity and
productivity is also consistent with the ndings by Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012), according to which more
delegation of authority implies a higher rm-level performance thanks to a better reallocation of resources.
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a¢ liates located at further levels of control would actually display higher levels of productivity. Our
data are thus consistent with the idea that further layers of management allow for the exploitation
of economies of scale for knowledge inputs, and hence a¢ liates belonging to bigger (more complex)
networks are relatively more productive. At the same time, once controlling for the overall hierarchical
complexity of the group, subsidiaries located at further hierarchical distances from the headquarters
discount a higher cost of communication and show (at the margin) a negative productivity premium.
One nal caveat is worth mentioning: throughout the analysis we have explored the boundaries of
Business Groups with respect to the make or buy(vertical integration) decision, which we have then
interacted with the extent of hierarchical complexity of the same group. We have instead considered as
given the decision on whether to locate production at home or abroad, thus encompassing multinational
enterprises as a subset of Business Groups, although in all our analyses we have always controlled for
the potentially di¤erent behavior of foreign vs. domestic a¢ liates.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we derive a general denition of Business Groups on
the basis of the existing literature and introduce our dataset, providing at the same time some stylized
facts. In Section 3 we construct our metrics of vertical integration and hierarchical complexity and
describe their properties. Section 4 relates our metrics of group boundaries to the home and host
countries institutions in which BGs operate, as well as to the performance of a¢ liate rms within
groups. Section 5 presents further lines of research and concludes.
2 The nature of Business Groups
2.1 Denition of Business Group
A commonly accepted denition of Business Groups does not exist in the economic or business lit-
erature, with Williamson (1975) already hinting at the fact that BGs should be located somewhere
between markets and hierarchies.10
In their survey article, Khanna and Yafeh (2007) consider Business Groups as operating in multiple
and often unrelated markets, but observe that they are formed by clusters of legally distinct rms
with a common management, a characteristic that makes them di¤erent from multidivisional forms of
organization. The nance literature emphasizes the groupspyramidal structure built by a controlling
shareholder through a chain of equity ties, and the possible conicts of interests arising with minority
shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006). The focus of the industrial
organization literature is instead on the creation of production chains through vertical integration
within and across industries (see for example the survey by Lafontaine and Slade, 2007) or, in the case
of international trade, through o¤shoring to foreign countries (among others Antràs, 2003; Grossman
and Helpman, 2004). The phenomenon of BGs has also been extensively explored by the business
literature, with a variety of di¤erent denitions summarized by Colpan and Hikino (2010).
In this paper we argue that the lowest common denominator of all existing approaches is rooted in
the nature of Business Groups as hybrid organizations of economic activities, halfway between markets
and hierarchies. As such, BGs are able to exchange intermediate goods and services on the market, but
10Business and sociological studies also pointed out the di¢ culty to classify network-like forms of organization through
a simple dichotomy of markets and hierarchies (see for example Powell, 1990; Granovetter, 1995; Hennart, 1993).
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possibly through a transfer price; they can relocate nancial resources across a¢ liates, but at more
favorable conditions if confronted with external nancing, via the development of internal capital
markets; they coordinate management decisions through majority stakes in controlled assets, but
have to consider as well minority shareholdersprotection. More generally, they have a exible form
of assetsownership that provides at the same time incentives to self-enforce promises of cooperation
among a¢ liates, given the control exerted by a common parent, without giving up the advantage
(if and when necessary) of organizing activities within a market-like environment, since each a¢ liate
maintains formal property rights on its production assets.11
We can thus dene a Business Group as a set of at least two legally autonomous rms whose
economic activity is coordinated through some form of hierarchical control via equity stakes. Legal
autonomy and hierarchy are jointly constituent attributes of BGs, distinguishing them from indepen-
dent rms (as these are legally autonomous but operate without impending hierarchies) and from
multidivisional rms (which are organized through internal hierarchies of branches, but without au-
tonomous legal status).12
Given the requirement of hierarchical control, our denition rules out strategic business alliances
but includes in principle joint ventures, since their assets are owned (and controlled) by more than
one proprietary rm. Under this general denition, multinational enterprises (MNEs) can also be
considered as a special case of Business Groups, since they have by denition at least one legally
autonomous a¢ liate located abroad, ultimately controlled by a parent located in the origin country.
In the case instead of economic entities with more than one productive plant (multi-plant rms),
if all plants are commanded by the same rm under a single legal status we consider them as branches
of that rm, as plants have no form of control on the production assets. On the other hand, if a plant
has autonomous legal status, we consider it as an autonomous rm, thus either independent or an
a¢ liate to a Business Group.
Our denition is wide enough to include either very simple groups with two rms, a parent and
one a¢ liate, or very complex groups with hundreds of domestic and/or foreign a¢ liates linked by
hierarchical control. Hence, for the sake of generality, we rule out any ad hoc denition in terms of
minimum number of a¢ liates or industries, as found in some management or business literature (e.g.
Colpan and Hikino, 2010).
2.2 Data
Having dened a Business Group as a combination of rms with autonomous legal status under
some form of hierarchical control, the main di¢ culty in identifying BGs is related to the notion
of control exerted by a parent on a¢ liates. We opt here for a denition of control as established
in international standards for multinational corporations (OECD 2005; UNCTAD, 2009; Eurostat,
11To this end, Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2001, 2002) introduce the notion of relational contract: the decision to
integrate or not is seen as dynamic in nature, as a repeated game subordinated to the establishment of the partieslong
term relationship. From this perspective, the emergence of Business Groups can be seen as a way to establish a superior
relational contract, which facilitates integration or non-integration whenever needed.
12The notions of branches/divisions and subsidiaries/a¢ liates tend to overlap in some contexts. In this paper, in
accordance with international standards (for example UNCTAD, 2009) we dene a branch as a new location, division,
department or o¢ ce that is set up by a corporation, yet still within the original companys legal boundary. We will
alternatively use the term subsidiary or a¢ liate for a legally independent company controlled by a parent.
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2007), where control is assumed if (directly or indirectly, e.g. via another controlled a¢ liate) the
parent exceeds the majority (50.01%) of voting rights of the a¢ liate and can thus be considered as
the Ultimate Controlling Institution / Ultimate Benecial Owner.13
Such a notion of control is not exhaustive, as it leaves outside the boundaries of BGs a¢ liates de
facto controlled through minority ownership (<50%), or peculiar forms of control derived by some
form of market advantage (e.g. a monopsony), as well as particular forms of government regulations
(e.g. golden shares). Yet, it has some clear advantages. First, the majority (50.01%) of voting rights
criterion creates a unique standard for both domestic and multinational Business Groups. Second,
it allows to rule out cases of double (or triple) accounting of a¢ liates among di¤erent groups, thus
generating a denition of the boundaries of a BG which is univocal (technically, each of our Business
Groups is a closed set). Third, such a denition of control allows for a straightforward comparison
with o¢ cial statistics, as the majority of voting rights is the criterion commonly used in international
standards on foreign a¢ liates (Eurostat or OECD FATS) and for international tax purposes (IAS,
IFRS).14
Figure 1: Business Groups as hierarchical graphs
Figure 1 represents the organization of a typical Business Group as it can be derived by the
application of the majority ownership notion of control. Such a representation corresponds to a
13Control derived by voting power, i.e. majority ownership, can be obtained through either direct or indirect cross-
participations. A company X can control 60% of shares of company A, which controls 70% of shares of company B.
Although company X does not formally control company B directly, it does indirectly, via company A. The latter, known
as the principle of the Ultimate Controlling Institution in OECD FATS Statistics (or Ultimate Benecial Owner in
UNCTAD data), allows to assign control of company B to company X, thus called the parent company.
14A potential drawback of this methodology is that it can lead to an overestimation of control in some bigger networks
of a¢ liates. See infra for a validation of our data and Vitali, Glattfelder and Battistoni (2011) for a reference on this
issue.
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mathematical object known as a hierarchical graph.15 The upper shaded node (1) represents the
headquarters (or parent company), conventionally placed at level 0 of the hierarchy. The lower shaded
nodes below level 0 represent the a¢ liates considered to be inside the boundaries of the same group,
on their di¤erent hierarchical levels, with the edges connecting the nodes representing participation
links.16 The white nodes are instead rms possibly participated by the considered Business Group,
but excluded from its boundaries on the basis of the majority ownership threshold.
Two di¤erent sorts of data have been combined to retrieve Business Groups: worldwide proprietary
linkages provided by the Ownership Database by Bureau Van Dijk and rm-level nancial accounts,
from Orbis, by the same Bureau van Dijk.17 Both proprietary linkages and nancial data refer to the
last available information available in year 2010. Appendix A provides a detailed description of our
data sources and of the methodology employed to identify Business Groups.
After considering (direct and indirect) control through majority ownership, we end up with 270,374
headquarters of Business Groups controlling a total of 1,519,588 a¢ liates in 207 countries in the year
2010. Given our hierarchical graph structure, rm-level data of a¢ liates are stratied according to
their position in each Business Group, taking into account the level of proprietary distance from the
headquarter. For each headquarter and each a¢ liate along the control chain we have industry a¢ li-
ations at the 6-digit NAICS rev. 2002 classication, including both primary and secondary activities
from which we can infer measures of vertical integration, as well as balance sheet data from which we
retrieve proxies of performance and productivity.
Not all rms in our dataset report a complete set of nancial data. Moreover, country-level data
for some institutional variables we use as controls are not available for every country. Hence, while
we discuss here the complete dataset to introduce stylized facts on Business Groups, in our empirical
strategies we rely on a restricted sample of data in which both rm-level and country-level information
are available. The restricted dataset still encompasses 208,181 headquarters (groups) controlling a total
of 1,005,381 a¢ liates in some 129 countries. The general properties of the data described here also
hold for the restricted sample of Business Groups.
In Table 1 we provide a geographical coverage of the whole sample by some main countries/areas.
The headquarters of Business Groups (parents) are classied by their home country in the second
column, while in the third column we report the total number of a¢ liates they control worldwide,
either domestically or abroad, a distinction provided respectively in column 4 (domestic a¢ liates)
and 5 (a¢ liates abroad, i.e. outward FDI by parents). In the last column we report the foreign
a¢ liates located in the area, resulting from inward FDI. Two thirds of Business Groups are originated
in OECD economies, with those headquarters controlling around 75% of a¢ liates recorded in our data
15Technically, a hierarchical graph is a particular variation of a at graph to which at least one parent node is added
so as to assign functions to the other nodes (Palacz, 2004). Hierarchical graphs in turn are a generalization of a tree
graph, in which several arms depart from one vertex as in a tree, but two di¤erent nodes are connected by only one
edge; in hierarchical graphs, instead, di¤erent ultimate vertices can be directly or indirectly connected through several
edges. Hence, di¤erent from a tree graph, in hierarchical graphs a parent node can coordinate other nodes at di¤erent
hierarchical levels. Such a property makes them particularly suitable to visualize complex organization patterns such as
the one represented by a BG with its command chain.
16 In this graph we interpret edges as control participations, but in a generic hierarchy of rms they could also represent
trade ows of intermediate goods and services, or information ows for coordinated management actions.
17Other recent studies, including Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009) or Alfaro, Conconi, Fadinger and Newman
(2011), exploit data sourced by Dun & Bradstreet (D&B). The latter is one of the sources now integrated in the Ownership
Database by Bureau Van Dijk. For further details on the original data sources, see Appendix A.
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(66% of which are domestic). Headquarters located in countries of the European Union, in particular,
control 48% of total a¢ liates, of which roughly one third (259,278) are located abroad. The situation
is di¤erent in the US, where around 46% of the a¢ liates controlled by American headquarters are
located abroad. Developing countries, not surprisingly, have a larger share of domestic groups, with
about 80% of the 371,577 a¢ liates controlled by non-OECD headquarters located domestically.
Confronting the last two columns of Table 1, we can see how the OECD countries attract the
vast majority (70%) of the 465,928 foreign a¢ liates recorded in our data. We also observe a positive
di¤erence between outward and inward FDI stock (as proxied by number of a¢ liates) in developed
economies, in particular in the case of US and Japan, where the number of a¢ liates located abroad
outnumbers respectively more than twofold and fourfold the number of foreign a¢ liates located in the
economy. European Union members seem an exception, but in that case it is intra-EU FDI activities
that makes the net position almost in balance. In developing countries the inward FDI stock of rms
is almost twice as large as the outward one.
Table 1: Geographic coverage of Business Groups (main countries/areas) by headquarters and a¢ liates
Economy
N. of parents
(Business Groups) N. of affiliates (A + B)
Domestic
affiliates (A)
Affiliates abroad
(B)
Foreign affiliates
located in economy
OECD 177,306 1,148,011 757,778 390,233 324,255
non-OECD 93,068 371,577 295,882 75,695 141,673
European Union 144,562 735,487 496,209 239,278 258,060
US 9,935 211,265 114,364 96,901 40,404
Rest of the world 115,877 572,836 421,441 151,395 167,464
of which:
Japan 14,236 119,374 102,306 17,068 4,351
Latin America 3,972 11,480 7,106 4,374 18,656
Middle East 3,130 18,008 7,675 10,333 9,147
China 1,922 24,868 18,146 6,722 17,494
Africa 1,095 10,733 5,961 4,772 12,298
ASEAN 1,870 26,333 15,272 11,061 15,578
Total 270,374 1,519,588 1,053,660 465,928 465,928
Only selected countries/areas are reported. Totals refer to all countries present in the complete sample.
To validate our dataset we can rely on few references since, to the best of our knowledge, there
is no similar dataset covering control chains of corporate activities both domestically and abroad
for all countries of the world. One partial exception is the World Investment Report of UNCTAD,
which compiles yearly a list of the biggest corporations currently operating in the world, all present
in our dataset with their a¢ liates. UNCTAD (2011) also reports the number of parents and a¢ liates
involved in FDI activities hosted by each country. Based on these data, in Figure 2 we report the
correlation between the number of headquarters controlling foreign a¢ liates abroad (left panel) and
the number of foreign a¢ liates (right panel) located in each country, as retrieved from our sample and
matched against the corresponding gures provided by UNCTAD (2011): correlations are .94 and .93,
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respectively.18
Figure 2: Sample validation: (Logs of) numbers of multinational parents and foreign a¢ liates by host
country in the sample and in UNCTAD (2011)
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Finally, an indirect validation of the data is reported in Altomonte et al. (2012). In that paper,
the authors have matched transaction- and rm-level data for France to the ownership structure of
companies as derived from our dataset, in order to estimate the amount of intra-rm (intra-group) and
arms length (non intra-group) exports of French rms to the US in 2009. Looking at the counterfactual
of o¢ cial data on US intra-rm and armslength imports from France, as retrieved from the US Census
Bureau, the two trade ows turned out to match very closely.
2.3 Stylized facts on Business Groups
Table 2 shows how rms that are a¢ liated to Business Groups are on average bigger than non-a¢ liated
rms along di¤erent dimensions (see Appendix A for information on the control group of non-a¢ liated
rms): they employ on average 88% more workers, their sales are larger, they are usually more capital-
intensive and almost twice more protable. They are also 4% more productive, even after controlling
for size and capital-intensity. Moreover, a¢ liation premia do not display dramatic di¤erences between
OECD and non-OECD economies.
In addition to the superior performance of BGsa¢ liates, another typical characteristic found in
the literature on heterogeneous rms is the remarkable skewness of the underlying distributions. In
terms of hierarchies, the left panel of Figure 3 shows that 57% of rms in our dataset represent very
simple organizations consisting of one headquarter and one a¢ liate, while about 13% of groups have
18The original source for data on a¢ liates in UNCTAD (2011) is Dun &Bradstreet, that is one of the sources of
ownership data on which the ORBIS database also relies. The survey of UNCTAD (2011) refers to data in 2009, while
our data are updated to 2010. We have excluded from the validation reported in Figure 2 the datapoint on China,
since the country does not adopt the international standard denition of control (>50.01%) in reporting the number of
a¢ liates, preferring a less committal criterion of foreign-funded enterprises, leading to non comparable gures.
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Table 2: Premia for a¢ liates of Business Groups vs non-a¢ liated rms
.88*** .90*** .80***
1.32*** 1.34*** 1.15***
1.26*** 1.25*** 1.37***
.30*** .29*** .35***
1.99*** 2.01*** 1.64***
.04*** .02*** .05***
(.008) (.008) (.008)
OECD economies non-OECD
economies
Log of profit
Log of labor productivity (1)
Dependent variable All countries
Log of employment
Log of turnover
Log of capital
Log of capital intensity
Binary regressions with country-per-industry xed e¤ects; **,
*** stand for signicance respectively at 5% and 1%; (1)
Capital-intensity and size added as a further control for a
one-factor measure of productivity. See Appendix A for details
on the control group of non-a¢ liated rms.
more than ve a¢ liates and only 0.7% of headquarters control more than 100 a¢ liates. However,
the right panel of Figure 3 also shows that those 0.7% of groups with more than 100 a¢ liates are
responsible for more than 70% of value added recorded in our data.
The skewness in the distribution is in any case heterogeneous across countries, as shown in Table
3. US corporate groups tend to be larger, with an average size of 21 a¢ liates against a total average
of 5, with largest groups operating in the nancial industry and some in manufacturing. In Asian
countries (Japan, China and the ASEAN region) we also detect the existence of conglomerates with
a higher number of a¢ liates on each percentile of the distribution, as well as groups that tend to be
internally engaged in all sectors of economic activities, from manufacturing to services.19 In the case
of Africa and Middle East, on the other hand, most of the bigger groups are active in the extraction of
natural resources and related activities. European groups are on average smaller in terms of number of
a¢ liates but there is a considerable di¤erence between northern countries (Germany, Sweden, Finland,
France) and southern countries (Italy and Spain), with the BGs originating from coreEurope being
usually bigger than the ones originated in Southern Europe.
In the next sections we rely on the property rights theory of the rm and try to make sense of
such a cross-country heterogeneity by linking some specic characteristics of Business Groups to the
host countriesinstitutional environment.
19This is an inheritance of the former keiretsu or chaebol business groupings in countries like Japan or S. Korea,
respectively.
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Figure 3: Size distribution of Business Groups, number of a¢ liates vs value added
a) Overall distribution of a¢ liates of
Business Groups (size classes)
b) Overall distribution of value added of
Business Groups (size classes)
Table 3: Descriptives of size distribution of a¢ liates by main countries/areas of origin
Home country Mean 50 perc 75 perc 95 perc 99 perc Max
OECD 6 1 3 17 94 2,707
non-OECD 4 1 2 13 46 996
European Union 5 1 3 13 65 2,557
USA 21 3 9 92 354 2,707
Rest of the
world 5 1 3 15 60 1,672
of which:
Japan 8 1 4 31 119 2,534
Latin America 3 1 2 8 37 229
Middle East 6 1 4 19 69 492
China 13 3 9 40 127 574
Africa 10 2 9 42 116 455
ASEAN 14 5 13 50 155 479
Total 5 1 3 16 74 2,707
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3 Metrics for Business Groups
3.1 Group vs. A¢ liate Vertical Integration
Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009) have explored the determinants of vertical integration in a large
dataset of rms. They found that the contemporary presence of higher contracting costs and better
nancial development is associated to a higher rm-level vertical integration. That is, a single rm
widens its boundary of economic activities in presence of both poor contract enforcement and good
nancial development, while contracting and nancing constraints, individually considered, seem to
have no e¤ect on vertical integration.20
In absence of actual data on internal shipments of intermediate goods and services across rms,
AJM (2009) proposed to proxy vertical integration exploiting the information on the set of industries
in which a rm is engaged, combined with the input coe¢ cient requirements that link those industries
as retrieved from input-output tables (see also Alfaro et al., 2011). A rm-level index was therefore
calculated summing up all input-output coe¢ cients that linked each rms primary activity to the
secondary activities in which it was involved. The assumption is thus that a rm engaged in more
industries, where backward and forward linkages in production are important, is supposed to have a
higher capacity to source internally more inputs for its nal output.21
In deriving these results, AJM(09) have however treated each rm in their sample as independent,
that is neglecting the possibility that the degree of vertical integration can be a function of the
coordinated management decision of a Business Group, where the decision to "make or buy" can be
di¤erentiated between headquarters and a¢ liates or across the same a¢ liates, as shown by the GM
vs. Mitsubishi example reported in Introduction.
To take into account the latter dimension, we have slightly rened the original AJM(09) index of
vertical integration. First, we consider two layers of integration: the group-level, which is the result
of all production activities performed by a¢ liates and headquarter altogether; and the a¢ liate-level,
that is the propensity of each a¢ liate to exchange intermediates within the network represented by the
group. Second, we take into account the number of lines of business in which a BG and its constituent
rms can be involved.
In particular, we assume that within a group two sets of activities can be identied: a set of output
activities j 2 NH , and a set of intermediate activities i 2 NA. The set of output activities coincides
with the primary and secondary activities of the headquarter (NH), whereas the range of intermediate
activities at the group-level is represented by the set of primary and secondary activities in which
controlled a¢ liates (NA) are involved.
With these assumptions, we can build a group-specic input-output table as the one illustrated in
Figure 4, where we report outputs in columns and inputs by row and where each combination V Iij is
the ith coe¢ cient requirement to produce the jth output.
20They also found that the impact of contractual frictions was more important in industries where holdup problems
were more relevant. Hence, once industrial composition was accounted for, they concluded that some countries with a
generalized problem of contractual incompleteness simply specialize in sectors where more vertical integration naturally
occurs, that is in sectors where technologies are less advanced.
21For a previous attempt in the business literature, on which Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009) have built, see
Fan and Lang (2000). For a similar application of this index see Alfaro et al. (2011).
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Figure 4: A group-specic input-output table
As in AJM(09) or Alfaro et al. (2011), we assume that industrial backward and forward linkages
for all rms in our sample can be proxied by US input-output tables22 and adopt the industrial
classication provided by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, with 61 main industries mainly at
a 3-digit level of disaggregation of the NAICS rev. 2002 classication. In Appendix B we report
the o¢ cial correspondence between the NAICS codes we retrieve from our data and the industries
reported by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
By summing up input coe¢ cient requirements by column in Figure 4 we obtain the vertical inte-
gration for each line of business in which the Business Group is involved.23 To retrieve the vertical
integration index for the whole group, we average the total of all input coe¢ cient requirements (V Iij)
by the number of output activities (jNH j), thus correcting for the potential conglomerate nature of
the group.
The result is the following group-specic (g) vertical integration index:
vg =
X
i2NA
j2NH
1
jNH jV Iij (1)
where V Iij are the input coe¢ cient requirements for any output activity j 2 NH sourcing from all
input activities j 2 NA. The group-specic vertical integration index can range from 0 to 1, where 1
corresponds to complete vertical integration.
The latter however does not capture the full picture of a BGs possible spectrum of choices in
22As in AJM(09), the use of the US inputoutput table for all countries is justied by the assumption that there is a
correlation in the input use patterns across countries. More in general, at the basis of the use of a common input-output
table there are the assumptions of a common technology frontier and either of a Leontief production function or of factor
price equalization.
23As in AJM(09), in absence of actual data on internal shipments of intermediates, we can interpret this number as
a mere propensity to be vertically integrated, where the sum of industry-level requirements gives us only the maximum
possible integration of production processes.
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dening its boundaries. In fact, Business Groups could report similar levels of vertical integration
at the level of headquarters, but they can organize each a¢ liate in a more or less integrated way,
according to the organizational structure of the group across industries. The latter is the case of
GM vs. Mitsubishi: as discussed, the former is a relatively specialized group, while the Japanese
conglomerate is involved in more than ten lines of business. And yet, calculating an index of vertical
integration at the level of headquarters as above (vg) would yield similar results across the two groups.
The reason is that a¢ liates in these two groups have themselves di¤erent degrees of vertical integration,
which compensatefor the ex-ante di¤erent diversication of the headquartersactivities (a¢ liates of
Mitsubishi tend to be bigger and active in more diversied sourcing industries then the ones of GM).
It then follows that estimating vertical integration in a sample that considers each BGs a¢ liate
as an independent rm would clearly miss the structural correlation linking a¢ liates belonging to
the same group, thus generating potentially biased results. This is an important feature of Business
Groupsboundaries which has been previously neglected in the analyses on vertical integration.
To better gauge the di¤erences in vertical integration strategies across BGs, we thus integrate the
group-index of vertical integration with a measure calculated directly at the individual a¢ liate level.
Here we consider primary or secondary activities of the single a¢ liate as intermediate inputs that can
be supplied potentially to all other co-a¢ liates and to the headquarters, and reclassify them according
to the main industries reported in Appendix B. We end up with the following a¢ liate-specic (va)
index of vertical integration:
va =
X
i 2 Na
j  NH
1
jNajV Iij (2)
where the input coe¢ cient requirements (V Iij) are taken for any ith among single a¢ liate activities
(Na  NA) that can lend to any jth main activity performed by the headquarter (NH). Averaging by
the number of main industries in which the single a¢ liate is involved allows again to correct for the
potential conglomerate nature of the a¢ liate itself. In a nutshell, going back to Figure 4, this time
we sum up coe¢ cient requirements by row, then averaging by the number of rows. As well as for the
previous group-specic index, the a¢ liate-level index can range from 0 to 1 and it can be interpreted
as the propensity of an a¢ liate to be vertically integrated with the rest of the group.
Both the group- and a¢ liate-specic indexes of vertical integration are additive on industries but
not on production units: a new industry adds to the sum of input-output coe¢ cients however small
its contribution can be to the nal output, but more rms can be involved in the same industry. For
these reasons, we expect the group-level index of vertical integration to be higher than the same index
calculated at the a¢ liate-level. In Figure 5 we report the sample distributions of both indices.
In our dataset the average vertical integration across groups (vg) is .062 (that is, on average 6
cents worth of inputs are sourced within groups for a one dollar unit of output), while the same
gure across individual a¢ liates (va) is .049. For comparison, the gure obtained by AJM(2009) on
their (unconstrained) sample is of .0487, very similar to the one obtained in our data for the a¢ liate-
level index. Alfaro et al. (2011) also calculated in a similar way a vertical integration index for
manufacturing rms with more than 20 employees, obtaining an average vertical integration of .063
which is similar to the one we obtain for groups. Similarly to Alfaro et al. (2011), both distributions
of our vertical integration indexes show long right-tails. In our case about 1,3% of Business Groups
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Figure 5: Group-level and a¢ liate-level vertical propensities, sample distributions
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groups of 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b) Density of va calculated on a sample of 1,005,381
a¢ liates; Mean: .049; standard deviation: .114;
skewness: 3.189.
can potentially source internally more than 50% of the value of their output, while only about 0.8%
of groups have a¢ liates that, individually taken, have vertical integration indexes in excess of 0.5.
3.2 Hierarchical complexity
A particularly convenient property of representing Business Groups as hierarchical graphs, as in Figure
1, is that it is possible to provide a synthetic measure of their organization through some hierarchical
form of entropy. We can thus proxy the process of coordinated management that occurs within the
hierarchy of rms in a BG by exploiting the information on the command chain that links single
a¢ liates to the ultimate headquarter.
Borrowing from graph theory, the entropy of a hierarchical graph G characterized by a total of L
levels of hierarchies can be constructed by assigning a discrete probability distribution p : L ! [0; 1]
to every level l in the hierarchy, where the probability pl =
nl
N is a function of the nl number of nodes
on each level l and the total number of nodes N , yielding a measure of node entropy
H(G) =  
X
l
pl log (pl) (3)
which is specic for hierarchical graphs (Emmert-Streib and Dehmer, 2007).24
The H(G) measure of entropy is characterized by some useful properties: a) it is continuous; b) it
is additive in L, so that each level l (order) of nodes can be considered a subsystem of the whole graph
G; c) the measure is maximal when all the outcomes are equally likely, i.e.there is an equal number of
24Dening pl =
nl
N
implicitly exploits a fundamental postulate in statistical mechanics or thermodynamics according
to which the occupation of any state is assumed to be equally probable. Also note that this formula uses a base-2
logarithm, rather than the natural log, in order to obtain positive marginal complexity for nl > 1.
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nodes on each level l. Finally, the logarithmic entropy is also symmetric, meaning that the measure
is unchanged if levels L are re-ordered.
The symmetry of the measure is however an unpleasant property when applied to the case of
Business Groups, since it implies that adding one node (a¢ liate) to the network increases its com-
plexity independently from the hierarchical level at which the node is added, that is @H(G)@pm =
@H(G)
@pn
with m 6= n being two di¤erent hierarchical levels. The latter is counter-intuitive in the case of a
hierarchical organization characterized by a headquarter, because one might expect that the degree
of coordination of the whole control chain (its complexity) should increase relatively more when
a¢ liates are incorporated at proprietary levels more distant from the vertex.
For this reason we have rened the original H(G) formula introducing an additional weight to the
probability distribution of levels more distant from the parent. After some straightforward manipu-
lations we can rewrite our node entropy measure for Business Groups, which we refer to as Group
Index of Complexity(GIC), as:
GIC =
LX
l
l
nl
N
log

N
nl

(4)
where as before the measure is a function of the nl number of a¢ liates on a given hierarchical level l,
of the total number N of a¢ liates belonging to the group and of the total number of levels (L).
The index can theoretically range within the [0;+1) interval, with zero now indicating a very
simple organization in which a headquarter controls one or more a¢ liates located just one level of
control below (l = 1). Moreover, the index retains some desirable properties of the original node
entropy, as it is (logarithmically) increasing in the number of hierarchical levels. We provide some
detailed statistical properties of the GIC in Appendix C.
Importantly for our purposes, and contrary to the original hierarchical entropy measure H(G), the
GIC now allows to take into account the marginal increase in complexity brought about by a¢ liates
added to lower hierarchical levels, since @GIC@pm >
@GIC
@pn
form < n (with pn;m being the usual probability
measures dened above), provided that nl > l. More specically, the logarithmic weight assigned to
the probability term p = nlN of every level is such to increase the measure of complexity when more
subsidiaries are included at di¤erent lower levels of distance, while the function is decreasing at the
margin when a¢ liates are added at the same level.25
The economic rationale for a decreasing marginal complexity when a¢ liates are added at the same
hierarchical level is associated to the idea that some economies of scale intervene when rms expand
their network of a¢ liates horizontally, while coordination (and communication) costs can become more
and more important once the network enlarges and deepens by locating a¢ liates to further levels from
the headquarter. This is in line with the literature on knowledge-based hierarchies (see for example
Garicano, 2000, or more recently Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012), according to which the optimal
design of a management hierarchy is the result of a trade-o¤ between knowledge and communication.
A further layer of management increases the utilization of knowledge, for which some economies of
scale are assumed, but at the same time it also increases the cost of communication along the hierarchy.
25This can be easily veried by taking the rst derivative of Eq. 4 with respect to N or nl. Note that now the
maximum entropy is not reached when outcomes of states are equally likely (i.e. there is an equal number of a¢ liates at
each level l). Rather, it is maximal when the group is pyramidal.
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Accordingly, in our case the hierarchical distance from the headquarter implies a higher xed cost
of communication (hence our correction for node entropy in eq. 4), while further a¢ liates on the same
level imply a decreasing marginal costof knowledge. As a result, the hierarchical complexity of an
object such as a Business Group cannot simply be proxied by its total number of a¢ liates N or by
its number of hierarchical levels, with the index of complexity being not strictly monotonous in N .
In Appendix C we provide further evidence of the sample comparison between a groupsnumber of
a¢ liates and our index of complexity.
Another way to measure the complexity of the hierarchy developed by a Business Group could be
the explicit introduction of an edge entropy, i.e. considering the strength of the cross participations
as a further dimension to be included in the entropy index. In this case, the index would di¤er if an
a¢ liate can be nally owned through direct participation (held by the headquarter) or indirect cross
participations (held by any other a¢ liates in the control chain).26 However, given the scope of our
analysis, the latter would not yield qualitatively di¤erent results, as we only use data on Business
Groups characterized by a majority threshold for control that includes direct and indirect equity ties,
in line with international business statistics. In terms of interpretation, that is equivalent to assume
that, once the group boundaries are identied through control, any share above such a threshold would
not signicantly a¤ect the complexity of the organization, as the headquarter would retain in any case
the decision power.
3.3 Vertical Integration and Hierarchical Complexity across Countries and Indus-
tries
In Table 4 we report sample averages of both the Group Index of Complexity (GIC) and the group-
level vertical integration (VPI), for some selected industries and geographical areas. The industry is
identied as the core sector where the majority of value added is created within the Business Group,
even though many larger BGs can be involved in more than one line of business. The country is
instead the home country where the headquarter is located, even though the group can have some
a¢ liates abroad.
The third and fourth columns of Table 4 show that, while group-level vertical integration is con-
stantly lower for OECD economies with respect to non-OECD economies for each reported industry,
the opposite is true for hierarchical complexity. Groups originated in the US are the ones showing
higher gures for hierarchical complexity in most industries, while Japanese groups display instead
lower delegation of control (they are hierarchically less complex). The gures for developing economies
show instead a higher variation across industries.
As expected, the less integrated among the reported industries is the category of business services
which rely less on physical inputs, while the most integrated groups can be found in the chemical
industry. The automotive industry, from which we derived the case studies of General Motors and
Mitsubishi sketched in the introduction, appears to be relatively less integrated than expected thanks
26 In this case we could modify the index considering a joint probability distribution pij = pei  pnj , such that pnj = nlN
as before and pei =
el
E
with el number of edges at level l and E total number of graph edges. The two eventsprobabilities
can be assumed as mutually independent, and hence we obtain the following index GIC =
PE
i
PL
J pij log (1=pij) where
@GIC
@pij
< 0; with nl; el 2 N and nl > 1; el > 1, obtaining a decreasing marginal complexity in both nodes and edges,
provided that we have at least one subsidiary and one control link on each level.
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to the presence of some very specialized small groups active in the provision of parts and components.
Indeed, looking at the automotive industry in US and Japan, the preliminary evidence of the case
studies is conrmed on industry aggregates, since the hierarchical complexity of the US car industry is
higher than Japan. However, gures for vertical integration suggest that Japanese automotive groups
exchange intermediates internally on average four times more than the US ones do.
Overall, cross-country variation seems to dominate cross-industry variation, especially when look-
ing at gures of hierarchical complexities. Based on this evidence, in the next section we explore the
relationship between group boundaries and country-level institutional determinants, controlling for
the residual sectorial heterogeneity via xed e¤ects.
Table 4: Group vertical propensity and organizational complexity (averages) by selected industries
and countries
Industry Index Countries/areas
OECD
non-
OECD
European
Union USA Japan China Africa
South
America ASEAN All countries
Mining group integration (vg) 0.034 0.140 0.031 0.058 0.061 0.013 0.051 0.112 0.021 0.073
GIC 0.626 0.356 0.124 0.764 0.339 0.370 0.597 0.924 0.922 0.530
Food group integration (vg) 0.071 0.151 0.065 0.105 0.138 0.067 0.078 0.074 0.083 0.114
GIC 0.650 0.216 0.561 1.537 0.299 0.272 0.760 0.210 0.818 0.425
Textiles and clothing group integration (vg) 0.061 0.101 0.062 0.077 0.052 0.072 0.064 0.046 0.080 0.079
GIC 0.503 0.170 0.426 1.639 0.257 0.134 1.160 0.366 0.836 0.349
Chemical products group integration (vg) 0.150 0.204 0.153 0.175 0.152 0.108 0.088 0.150 0.128 0.172
GIC 0.789 0.278 0.538 1.579 0.455 0.096 0.301 0.293 0.736 0.588
Automotive group integration (vg) 0.067 0.069 0.044 0.137 0.186 0.033 0.067 0.120 0.081 0.068
GIC 0.944 0.424 0.775 2.169 0.501 0.243 2.340 0.113 1.484 0.746
Electronic products group integration (vg) 0.079 0.114 0.059 0.115 0.102 0.104 0.129 0.044 0.068 0.094
GIC 0.736 0.276 0.655 1.032 0.651 0.182 0.950 0.103 0.733 0.537
Business services group integration (vg) 0.013 0.036 0.012 0.048 0.071 0.080 0.100 0.101 0.042 0.022
GIC 0.531 0.205 0.530 0.833 0.261 0.482 0.348 0.073 0.854 0.426
All sectors group integration (vg) 0.025 0.126 0.025 0.060 0.023 0.052 0.075 0.132 0.047 0.062
GIC 0.418 0.233 0.410 0.989 0.114 0.311 0.601 0.308 0.808 0.354
Sample averages for group integration (vg) and Group Index of Complexity (GIC). Industries are identied as the
core activity where most value added is created. Countries as the origin of the parent company.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Group boundaries and institutions
We begin our analysis by applying the empirical strategy developed by Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton
(2009) to our group-specic and a¢ liate-specic measures of vertical integration, then adding a control
for the group-specic hierarchical complexity.
In particular we assume that a Business Group decides the organization of production activities in
two stages: rst the group decides how much total vertical integration it wants to achieve.27 Then, in
27At this stage we can assume that the group also decides where (at home or abroad) it wants to locate its activities,
a decision which we take as exogenous in this paper.
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a second stage, managers decide how to achieve the desired degree of vertical integration, distributing
it between a¢ liates and headquarters and across a¢ liates, also based on the underlying hierarchical
structure in which a¢ liates are placed.28 We thus test for the drivers of Business Groupsboundaries
in nested steps: rst we consider the drivers of group-level vertical integration; then we test for vertical
integration at the a¢ liate level, given the choice of vertical integration at the group-level; further, we
control for the level of hierarchical complexity of the group to which the a¢ liate belongs.
In the rst specication, we take as a dependent variable the measure of group-level vertical
integration (vgkc) introduced in the previous section, which is specic for each group g located in
country c and operating in a core industry k:
vgkc = 0 + 1Xcg + 2Zcg + 3XcgZcg + 4GICg + 5mneg+
+ 6 ln empg + 7 ln gdpccg + k + "gkcg (5)
In this model, Xcg and Zcg are the two proxies for country-level contract enforcement and nancial
development already employed in Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009). They are respectively the
(opposite of) country-level average cost of a claim expressed as percentage of the total value of the
claim29 and the country-level ratio of private credit provided by all nancing institutions to GDP.30
Three controls for the characteristics of business groups are included. The rst is a proxy for
the group size (employment, empg), obtained either directly from the headquarters balance sheet
consolidated data, if available, or calculated summing up the employees of the headquarters and
a¢ liates. The second control is our entropy-like measure for hierarchical complexity (GICg), which
controls for the fact that a higher level of vertical integration might be correlated to a more or less
complex corporate structure. Finally, a binary variable (mneg) controls whether or not each Business
Group owns a¢ liates operating outside from his home country.
As in Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009), we also control for the potential endogeneity of
institutions to development, through the (log of) GDP per capita (gdpccg) of the country where the
headquarter is located, assumed to be the country of origin (home country) of the business group.
A set of 3-digit NAICS industry xed e¤ects (k) is added to exclude that our results are the
consequence of a peculiar industrial composition. On that, note that even though Business Groups
can be active in more than one industry, we assign each group to the core 3-digit activity of their
headquarters, that is one of the activities which we have used as outputs in our index of vertical
integration where most of the value added is generated. Errors are clustered by country, and variables
are standardized to obtain beta coe¢ cients. Nested results are reported in Table 5.
Results show that contracting and nancial conditions on a country-level are both signicantly
28Although the latter is obviously a semplication of the coordination of managerial decisions within the group, we
nd support for this hypothesis in the nding by Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson (2012), according to which acquired
plants in US usually resemble the acquiring rms in terms of vertical integration. That is, they start shipping their
production to locations that their acquirers had already been shipping to, and they produce outputs that their acquirers
had already been manufacturing.
29The cost in court fees and attorney fees, where the use of attorneys is mandatory or common, expressed as a
percentage of the debt value (World Bank, 2011a). The higher the cost the more di¢ cult to enforce the contract. To
ease interpretation of results, we have taken the opposite of this variable.
30Private credit by any nancing institution to GDP for 129 countries, sourced by the work of Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt
(2009), updated now regularly for the World Bank (2011b). This variable has been extensively used in some nance
literature, see for example Rajan and Zingales (1998).
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Table 5: Group-level vertical integration, group complexity and institutional constraints
Dependent variable : I II III IV
Group integration
contract enforcement -.139*** -.114*** -.116***
(.037) (.037) (.037)
financial development -.085*** -.070** -.071**
(.035) (.027) (.028)
contract enforcement*financial development .023 .020
(.024) (.024)
group index of complexity .073***
(.024)
multinational -.056
(.035)
(log of) group employment -.003 .001 .003 .003
(.006) (.006) (.004) (.003)
(log of) GDP per capita -.234*** -.229*** -.188*** -.185***
(.059) (.079) (.056) (.057)
Constant 2.290*** 2.247** 1.812*** 1.838***
(.633) (.818) (.582) (.583)
3-digit industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Errors clustered by country Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (N. of Business Groups) 222,433 222,433 222,433 222,433
Industries 88 88 88 88
Countries 129 129 129 129
Adjusted R squared .357 .361 .376 .377
*, **, *** signicance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Beta coe¢ cients, errors
clustered by country.
and separately correlated with a groups vertical integration, even after controlling for industrial
composition. We nd in particular that a better contract enforcement reduces the scope for vertical
integration, since in this case Business Groups can rely on external suppliers for the provision of
inputs with a lower probability that they renege on commitments. Similarly, our results also show
that a higher level of nancial development reduces the necessity to internalize production activities:
as credit constraints are less stringent thanks to the availability of better capital markets, outsourcing
outside the boundaries of the group is the preferred strategy.
These results are in line with the general priors of the literature and only slightly di¤erent from the
ones presented by Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton (2009): in their case rm-level vertical integration at
the country-level was found to be positively correlated with the interaction term between contracting
institutions and nancial frictions (not signicant in our case), while the individual variables in their
estimates were correctly signed (as in our case) but individually not-signicant. We believe this
di¤erence in results is due to our choice of explicitly considering group a¢ liation in the construction
of the vertical integration index.31
31 Indeed, in the robustness and sensitivity checks we present in Table 7, we report in Column 1 the results of the above
exercise carried out exactly as in AJM(09), that is ignoring the property linkages among rms when constructing the
vertical integration indexes. As in their case, we now also get correctly signed but poorly signicant coe¢ cients. More
in general, it is not completely clear in existing literature how contractual and nancial frictions combine together in
determining the level of vertical integration. Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2007) show theoretically how these two
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Finally, we also nd that the level of total integration is not di¤erent for multinational and domestic
BGs, as the control in the last column of Table 5 conrms, which further strenghtens the idea that the
home country institutional environment is a powerful driver of the organization of a Business Group.
Given the ability of Business Groups to design vertical integration also across a¢ liates, we nest the
above results in the vertical integration choice of each a¢ liate, by estimating the following equation:
va(g)kc = 0 + 1Xca + 2Zca + 3XcaZca + 4GICg + 5GICgXca+
+ 6GICgZca + 7vg + 8vgXca + 9vgZca + 10 ln gdpcca+
+ 11 ln empa + 12 ln empg + k + "a(g)kca (6)
where in this case we take as dependent variable the a¢ liate-specic (a) vertical integration within
the gth group (va(g)kca), dened in Equation (2) as the average propensity to ship intermediate inputs
within the group network.
Each a¢ liate is characterized by a core activity (k), where we assume most of value added is created
(even though the a¢ liate can be involved in more than one primary and/or secondary activities), and
by a country (ca) in which the a¢ liate is located, possibly di¤erent from the country of origin of the
Business Group, in which case we will be dealing with a foreign a¢ liate.32 Hence, the set of proxies
of institutional frictions (Xca , Zca), their interaction and the (log) of GDP per capita (gdpcca) now all
refer to the a¢ liate hosting country.
The inclusion of both the group index of complexity (GICg) and the group vertical integration (vg)
as covariates is crucial in our setting to comprehend how business groups solve the trade-o¤ between
vertical integration at the headquarter vs. a¢ liate-level within a given institutional setting. For this,
we will also interact these two covariates with our proxies of institutional frictions.
Group-level and a¢ liate-level employment (empa, empg) in logs are also added as controls, as well
as a set of NAICS 3-digit industry xed e¤ects (k) that take into account potential di¤erences in the
industrial composition of the sample, while errors are clustered by country. Results are reported in
Table 6.
Similar to the results of the group-level specication, we observe that the a¢ liate-level vertical
integration is negatively correlated with contract enforcement and nancial development: better in-
stitutions not only reduce the scope for total vertical integration, but also allow single a¢ liates to be
relatively more specialized in the production of fewer inputs required by common production processes.
We also nd that, on average, a¢ liate and group integration are positively correlated, as similar en-
vironments lead the single a¢ liate to resemble the parent group when designing its boundary, in line
with the ndings of Atalay et al. (2012).
The negative signs in the interaction terms between group integration and institutional quality
measures (column 5) point however to the idea that the better the institutions in a country, the higher
factors can be complementary in the choice of the organizational form, since rms face a credit constraint when investing
in a contractual relationship with suppliers and thus, credit markets being imperfect, even in presence of a low cost of
contracting, important nancial frictions can lead to a choice of vertical integration. On the other hand, the nance
literature arrives at di¤erent conclusions: higher nancial development implies either less or more integration depending
on how authors proxy integration (rm size, layers of management).
32 In Table 7 we will specically test for the robustness of our results when dealing with foreign a¢ liates only.
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Table 6: A¢ liate-level integration, group complexity and institutional constraints
Dependent variable : I II III IV V VI
Affiliate integration
contract enforcement -.128*** -.104** -.094** -.095** -.099**
(.061) (.045) (.043) (.044) (.043)
financial development -.151*** -.138*** -.136*** -.140*** -.142***
(.040) (.041) (.039) (.042) (.038)
contract enforcement*financial development .018 .019 .018 .007
(.034) (.033) (.035) (.031)
group integration .079*** .075*** .068***
(.020) (.022) (.015)
group integration*contract enforcement -.037*** -.018**
(.009) (.008)
group integration*financial development -.080*** -.070***
(.012) (.006)
group index of complexity -.012
(.014)
group index of complexity*contract enforcement .019
(.015)
group index of complexity*financial development .035***
(.011)
(log of) group employment -.002 -.002 -.002
(.004) (.004) (.003)
(log of) affiliate employment -.019 -.009 -.013 -.013 -.011 -.011
(.012) (.009) (.009) (.008) (.009) (.008)
(log of) GDP per capita -.289*** -.163 -.146* -.133* -.148* -.105
(.094) (.100) (.079) (.071) (.084) (.069)
Constant 2.980*** 1.671 1.502* 1.374* 1.384* 1.070
(.994) (1.058) (.824) (.749) (.751) (.726)
3-digit industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Errors clustered by country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (N. of affiliates) 1,005,381 1,005,381 1,005,381 1,005,381 1,005,381 1,005,381
Industries 110 110 110 110 110 110
Countries 129 129 129 129 129 129
Adjusted R squared .400 .402 .410 .415 .417 .421
*, **, *** signicance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Beta coe¢ cients, errors clustered by country.
is the exibility of a group in selecting the degree of specialization of its a¢ liates. In other words,
in goodinstitutional environments a¢ liates are relatively less similar in terms of vertical integration
with respect to their group: a higher contract enforcement and/or a better nancial development allow
the single a¢ liate to specialize more with respect to the group to which it belongs, thus exchanging
fewer inputs within the same group.
Finally, in column 6 of Table 6, we introduce as a further control our metric of hierarchical com-
plexity and its interaction with institutions. Results point at a potential trade-o¤ between integration
and complexity in the organizational design of a Business Groups boundaries: controlling for the level
of nancial development in the host country, a groups vertical integration and a groups hierarchical
complexity have a di¤erent impact (one negative, the other positive) on the degree of vertical integra-
tion of each a¢ liate. In other words, controlling for institutions, a given level of integration achieved
by a¢ liates stems from an alternative combination of vertical integration and hierarchy in the group.
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These results are in line with the case study of GM vs. Mitsubishi, in which di¤erent degrees of
a¢ liates integration can be associated to similar levels of group integration only since hierarchical
complexity varies across the two groups (with GMs a¢ liates being placed in a relatively more complex
hierarchical structure).33
The latter ndings conrms the idea that within Business Groups vertical integration choices are
not independent from decisions on the organization of the hierarchy of rms across groups. Ignoring
this latent organizational variable when checking for the drivers of vertical integration of rms, as well
as the correlation between group and a¢ liate levels of vertical integration (e.g. considering all rms
as independent in a sample) might thus lead to an omitted variable bias.
In Table 7 we present some tests of sensitivity of our results. In the rst column, as already
discussed, we reproduce for our sample the original methodology by Acemoglu, Johnson and Mitton
(2009). That is, we calculate the index of vertical integration for each rm as in AJM(09), i.e. assuming
that each rms primary activities are its outputs while its secondary activities are internally produced
inputs, but ignoring the property linkages among rms as well as its position in the hierarchy of the BG,
thus considering each rm as independent. Results show that, as expected, when omitting the Business
Group dimension the model is less well specied, and thus institutional variables lose signicance.
In the second column of Table 7 we restrict our sample only to a¢ liates with more than 20
employees, in order to check if previous results are driven by the presence of a larger set of small
rms, in which vertical integration can be assumed to be negligible. Coe¢ cients remain very similar
to previous results also in magnitude. In the third column we exclude the simplest Business Groups
characterized by only one a¢ liate and one headquarter, to verify the extent to which results are driven
by the relatively large presence of groups of this kind in our sample: results are quite stable and all
previous comments can be considered valid.
Findings are also robust (albeit slightly less signicant) also when considering separately foreign
a¢ liates, as shown in the fourth column of Table 7. Part of this loss of signicance can be explained
by the smaller variance we notice in the subsample of foreign a¢ liates, since they are more similar
than domestic a¢ liates in terms of vertical integration. On the other hand, with respect to the
average a¢ liate in our sample, a¢ liates of multinational corporations might be more inuenced by
organizational strategies developed in their country of origin, and hence relatively less inuenced in
their organizational design by the host country characteristics measured in this exercise.
33Clearly both group-level vertical integration and organizational complexity can be endogenous to institutions: in
an exercise not reported here, we have tested the correlation between BGs organizational complexity and institutional
frictions (controlling for industrial composition and rm-level characteristics), nding that the relationship is positive
and signicant only in the case of nancial development. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is no previous
contribution investigating the direction of causality between institutions, vertical integration and organizational com-
plexity, nor we have time-varying measures of the latter that allow for such a test. As such, the evidence reported here
should be interpreted as correlations.
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Table 7: Sensitivity of results: a¢ liate-level vertical integration
Dependent variable : AJM_09 > 20
employees
> 1 affiliate domestic
affiliates
foreign
affiliates
Affiliate integration
contract enforcement -.042* -.104** -.094** -.106** -.054*
(.024) (.041) (.042) (.041) (.026)
financial development -.012 -.151*** -.149*** -.152*** -.101**
(.025) (.037) (.037) (.038) (.046)
contract enforcement*financial development .003 -.003 .003 .024 -.022
(.017) (.028) (.030) (.031) (.032)
group integration .068*** .061*** .075*** .030***
(.015) (.013) (.025) (.008)
group index of complexity -.012 -.016 -.008 -.014*
(.014) (.014) (.014) (.006)
group integration*contract enforcement -.020** -.015* -.013 -.006*
(.008) (.008) (.012) (.002)
group integration*financial development -.064*** -.064*** -.081*** -.028***
(.006) (.006) (.011) (.006)
group index of complexity*contract enforcement .018 .015 -.005 .004
(.015) (.015) (.015) (.006)
group index of complexity*financial development .033*** .038*** .015** .040*
(.011) (.011) (.007) (.018)
(log of) group employment -.001 -.002 .005 -.001
(.004) (.003) (.004) (.001)
(log of) affiliate employment -.003 -.012 -.010 -.012 -.003
(.004) (.008) (.008) (.009) (.007)
(log of) GDP per capita -.086** -.088 -.096 -.130** -.013
(.037) (.068) (.069) (.064) (.070)
Constant .872** .908 .979 1.321* .046
(.376) (.715) (.725) (.672) (.074)
3-digit industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Errors clustered by country Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (N. of affiliates) 1,005,381 831,319 875,727 748,453 256,928
Industries 110 110 110 108 109
Countries 129 129 129 129 129
Adjusted R squared .215 .445 .422 .469 .291
*, **, *** signicance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Beta coe¢ cients, errors clustered by country.
4.2 Group boundaries and performance
Another interesting dimension in the analysis of Business Groups is the relationship between verti-
cal integration and productivity. Recently Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson (2012) have empirically
investigated US plant-level data showing that vertically integrated plants have on average higher pro-
ductivity levels. They also nd that this productivity premium reects a cherry-picking e¤ect, with
already more e¢ cient plants integrated ex post into more vertical structures.34
Consistently with these ndings, in Table 2 we have shown that also in our dataset rms that are
a¢ liated to Business Groups (and thus to some extent vertically integrated) are on average bigger
and more productive than non-a¢ liated rms. What remains to be seen, however, is the extent to
34For other works showing a positive correlation between vertical integration and productivity, see for example Mak-
simovic et al. (2002) or Schoar (2002), both investigating conglomerate rms. In the rst a selection e¤ect is claimed
to be responsible for the productivity di¤erences between integrated and non-integrated rms. In the second work
diversication is a driver for such di¤erences.
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which di¤erent levels of vertical integration map into a di¤erent productivity of a¢ liates, considering
that vertical integration for Business Groups is a multi-dimensional concept (at the headquarters vs.
a¢ liates level, and across a¢ liates distributed along more or less complex hierarchies). To explore
these issues, we test whether the productivity levels of BGsa¢ liates are systematically correlated to
vertical integration and/or hierarchical complexity of the group, controlling for a number of additional
groupscharacteristics.
In our specication we take as dependent variable (the log of) labor productivity (proda(g)kca)
calculated as value added per employee of each a¢ liate a belonging to the gth group, operating in
core industry k and located in country ca.
ln proda(g)kca = 0 + 1va(g)kca + 2vg + 3GIC

g + 4hdista(g)kca + 5fora(g)kca+
+ 5 ln empa(g)kca + 6 ln empg + 7 ln kla(g)kca + kca + "a(g)kca (7)
A¢ liate-level and group-level vertical integration (va(g)kca , vg), as well as hierarchical complexity
(GICg ) with  = 1; 2 are included as covariates, together with the hierarchical distance (hdista(g)kca)
of each a¢ liate a within group g. The latter is the level at which the single rm is located within
the network of a¢ liates that form a Business Group, as depicted in Figure 1, and can be interpreted
as a control for the communication ability of the a¢ liate with the center of decision represented by
the headquarter. Controls for capital intensity and size at the a¢ liate level (empa(j)kca , kla(j)kca)
correct for the possible bias deriving from the use of a one-factor productivity indicator, at the same
time controlling for relation-specic investments that a rm with a higher capital-intensive production
can undertake. Total employment is included as a control at the level of the group (empg), together
with a full set of (country-per-industry) xed e¤ects (kc), in order to neutralize at this stage of the
analysis all possible di¤erences in institutional environments combined with industrial composition
(here considered at the 3 digit level of disaggregation), and thus isolate as much as possible the e¤ects
of organizational design on a¢ liatesperformance. Errors are clustered at the headquarter level, to
account for within-group correlation. Nested results are presented in Table 8.
Looking at results, when we do not control for country xed e¤ects, as in the rst column of
Table 8, we obtain a negative correlation between vertical integration and productivity, both at the
group- and at the a¢ liate-level. This is because, as also shown by Table 4, Business Groups and their
constituent rms are more vertically integrated in developing economies, where institutional frictions
are more present and rm performance is on average lower than in developed economies. On the other
hand, including country xed e¤ects but excluding industry xed e¤ects (column 2 of Table 8), we nd
a positive correlation between both indexes of vertical integration and productivity, although in this
case several omitted variables can bias the correlation, among which the degree of market competition
and the specic contractual completeness of the industry in which the rms operate. This is why
starting from column 3 we include country-per-industry xed e¤ects.
Controlling for country-level heterogeneity combined with industrial composition (column 3), we
nd that only a¢ liate vertical integration is associated to average a¢ liatesproductivity, while group
integration is not signicant. The latter result is conrmed also controlling for foreign a¢ liates (which
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Table 8: Productivity levels and Business Groupsdimensions
Dependent variable : OLS fe OLS fe OLS fe OLS fe OLS fe OLS fe
log of (labor productivity) (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
-2.092*** .377*** .133** .106* .104* .104*
(.085) (.055) (.059) (.063) (.063) (.063)
-.587*** .239*** .055 .041 .035 .034
(.097) (.050) (.037) (.039) (.040) (.041)
.062*** .020*** .009*** .038*** .041***
(.004) (.003) (.002) (.005) (.005)
-.002*** -.002***
(.000) (.000)
.283*** .256*** .246*** .250***
(.012) (.012) (.012) (.012)
-.012***
(.004)
.073*** .027*** .019*** .015*** .013*** .013***
(.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002)
.264*** -.037*** -.030*** -.020*** -.022*** -.022***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
.264*** .171*** .181*** .181*** .180*** .180***
(.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003) (.003)
3.956*** 4.337*** 4.294*** 4.295*** 4.280*** 4.295***
(.020) (.016) (.017) (.015) (.015) (.015)
3-digit industry fixed effects Yes No No No No No
Country fixed effects No Yes No No No No
Country*industry fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Errors clustered by headquarter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations (N. of affiliates) 219,368 219,368 219,368 219,368 219,368 219,368
N. of Business Groups 64,026 64,026 64,026 64,026 64,026 64,026
Industries 105 105 105 105 105 105
Countries 129 129 129 129 129 129
adjusted R_squared .288 .164 .479 .487 .488 .488
(log of) group employment
foreign
hierarchical distance
Constant
(log of) capital intensity
affiliate integration
group complexity
group complexity^2
group integration
(log of) affiliate employment
*, **, *** signicance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Errors clustered by headquarters.
in turn, consistently with other ndings in the literature, are found to be some 25% more productive
than the average rm).
When also controlling for the hierarchic organization of the group (column 4), we nd that all the
measures of vertical integration lose both signicance and magnitude, while hierarchical complexity
appears to be positively and signicantly related to productivity. This result is partially in line with
the evidence provided by Atalay, Hortacsu and Syverson (2012) in the case of US data, according to
which much of the positive correlation between plant performance and vertical ownership structures
fades away when controlling for rm size as proxied by total revenues, employment or number of
establishments. However, di¤erently from Atalay et al. (2012), in our strategy we distinguish between
actual (a¢ liate or group) size, measured by (a¢ liate or group) employment in the above specications,
and hierarchical complexity, being able to show that also this latter dimension matters for a¢ liates
productivity.35
35Besides the possible omitted variable bias due to the exclusion of a measure of hierarchical complexity, Atalay,
Hortacsu and Syverson (2012) limited their analysis to plants within rms, without an explicit control for ownership
structures developed by Business Groups. As discussed, this latter feature might lead to an underestimation of the level
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The nding that the positive correlation between hierarchical complexity and productivity domi-
nates the one between vertical integration and productivity can be related to the theoretical framework
developed by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Garicano and Hubbard (2007), who model rms
as knowledge-based hierarchies. According to this strand of literature, knowledge is a typical intangible
asset which is complementary to physical inputs involved in vertically linked products. Knowledge can
be accumulated for example by hiring better managers and adopting better managerial procedures,
but it has a xed cost. Therefore, given a rm size (in our case group size), best intangible assets
can be shared in the presence of a larger number of units of production and hence their costs can be
smoothed on a larger scale. Our results add to these ndings, by showing that, within a Business
Group structure, besides the positive relationship between group size and performance, also the com-
plexity of the command chain is positively correlated with productivity.36 A well designed mechanism
for the transmission of knowledge seems here crucial since it allows for an e¢ cient exploitation of
intangible assets throughout appropriately designed hierarchies able to decentralize decisions at the
level where they are needed.
Unfortunately we have no direct information on the actual delegation of authority occurring within
Business Groups. Still, we can presume that a higher number of layers of management (both in levels
and nodes) could imply a more complex /delegated decision process. Under this assumption, our
results can then be considered also in line with the ndings of Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012),
according to which more delegation of authority implies a higher rm-level performance thanks to a
better reallocation of resources.37
Our results also show that too complex an organization can also be problematic. As previously
discussed, our measure of hierarchical complexity takes into account the higher xed costs of commu-
nication between the single a¢ liate and the headquarter when more than one layer of management
is involved in the decision process. From the point of view of the headquarter, it might be e¢ cient
to decentralize decisions at lower levels of hierarchies to better exploit intangible assets, but at the
same time, as coordinating a decision with a distant a¢ liate is relatively more cumbersome, internal
coordination costs can become so high that the organization becomes too complex to be managed
e¢ ciently. To capture this e¤ect, in column 5 of Table 8 we have introduced a squared term in our
hierarchical complexity variable, which turns out to be negative and signicant. This latter result is
in line with the microfoundation of organization provided by Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), in
which a minimum e¢ cient scale exists in the acquisition and communication of knowledge throughout
the hierarchy, associated to the emergence of endogenous communication costs.
Although we do not have information on a groups minimum e¢ cient scale of production, from our
of vertical integration actually occurring within some of their non-independent rms.
36 In an exercise not reported here we included as a further control the simple number of group a¢ liates, which turned
out to be not signicant and quasi-collinear to group employment. At the same time the magnitude and signicance
of the coe¢ cient for hierarchical complexity was pratically unaltered. The latter result points at the fact that group
employment and number of a¢ liates can be replaceable proxies for a group size, but not for a group organization.
Reciprocal sample properties for number of a¢ liates (N) and the Global Index of Complexity (GIC) are reported in
Appendix C.
37An increasing attention has been devoted to the phenomenon of the attening rm, where the elimination of
intermediate positions of authority within a rms hierarchy and the higher delegation given to divisional managers is
often considered as endogeneous to product market competition. See for example Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2010)
and Marin and Verdier (2009).
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estimates we can calculate the optimal threshold of complexity after which, ceteris paribus, returns
from hierarchical complexity start to decrease: this is quite large, as it corresponds to a GIC of around
9.5, associated to groups exceeding the number of 550 a¢ liates and/or organized in control chains
with over 5 levels of hierarchical distance.38 Such an evidence of marginally decreasing returns from
increasing complexity is relevant, as it puts a natural limit to the growth in complexity: indeed, only
1% of groups in our sample (the critical value of GIC is around the 99th percentile of its distribution)
exceed this average optimalorganizational threshold.
Finally, as a robustness check of the theoretical assumption of increasing marginal costs of com-
munication across hierarchical levels, in the last specication of Table 8 we have introduced a control
for the simple hierarchical distance of the a¢ liate, i.e. the length of the command chain linking each
a¢ liate to the parent company. We nd that on average the further the rm is from the decision
making center, the lower its level of productivity appears to be. But the latter result only holds
when we control at the same time for our measure of hierarchical complexity. When considering only
hierarchical distance in the model, i.e. excluding hierarchical complexity, a¢ liates located at further
levels of control would actually display higher levels of productivity. This is consistent with the idea
that across BGs a¢ liates located at lower hierarchical levels discount a higher positive premium for
productivity thanks to the organization e¤ects discussed before, while within BGs (that is, when we
do control for hierarchical complexity) the higher marginal costs of internal communication a¤ects the
single a¢ liates performance.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have sketched a comprehensive picture of the phenomenon of Business Groups across
countries, showing how BGs, although more numerous in developing economies, constitute however
a relevant share of economic activities, in terms of both value added generation and trade, also in
developed countries.
We have also shown that given their peculiar ownership structure, the most recent tenets of the
theory of the rm and of organizational economics can be nested within Business Group structures,
provided that some renements to the existing methodologies are taken into account.
To that extent, we have improved upon traditional measures of vertical integration, distinguish-
ing between an a¢ liate- and a group-level propensity to exchange intermediate inputs. We have
also discussed why, studying Business Groups, it is necessary to complement these measures with a
novel metric able to account for the hierarchical complexity of the command chain linking a¢ liates
and headquarters. Our novel metric borrows from graph theory and is consistent with recent works
modelling rms as knowledge-based hierarchies (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Garicano and
Hubbard, 2007; Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012).
Through these renements, we have shown how the decision process related to the design of bound-
aries in Business Groups is truly multi-dimensional, as vertical integration choices are not independent
38Note that our Group Index of Complexity is not strictly monotonous in either number of a¢ liates or levels of distance,
and thus a given value can identify a range of cases with di¤erent combinations in terms of numbers of a¢ liates or control
levels.
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from decisions on the organization of management within the hierarchy. Thus, ignoring both the im-
pending ownership structure that links rms in a common hierarchy and the interplay that occurs
between integration and organization might lead to unobserved omitted variable biases, for example
when studying the institutional drivers of production networks.
More in particular, our results point at a positive and signicant relationship between a¢ liates
productivity and hierarchical complexity which dominates the positive relationship between perfor-
mance and vertical integration. This nding is consistent with the theoretical framework by Garicano
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Garicano and Hubbard (2007), according to which knowledge is a
typical intangible asset complementary to physical inputs involved in vertically linked products, and a
higher scale of production allows for a smoothing of its xed costs thanks to a well designed mechanism
of transmission along the hierarchy.
The latter relationship is non-linear in our data, reecting a trade-o¤ between the accumulation
of knowledge and its communication down the hierarchy, a result in line with the work by Caliendo
and Rossi-Hansberg (2012), where internal coordination costs could become too high to e¢ ciently
exploit coordinated management decisions. With some caveats due to limitations of our data, we
can interpret our results also in the light of the ndings by Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2012),
according to which more delegation of power within the rm is associated with a better allocation of
resources.
A number of further lines of research stem from the above analysis. First of all, it is unclear if the
correlation between organization and productivity is the result of a cherry-picking process, in which
bigger and/or more complex business groups select rms with the better prospects on the market. To
recover some evidence on the latter direction of causality we have used a subset of our data for which
we have information on the date of acquisition of a rm by a Business Group. We have found that
the relation holds also using the growth rates of productivity, but due to the persistency over time of
the hierarchical complexity variable, more work needs to be undertaken in this direction.
A second line of research should investigate the country and industry variation in BGs foreign
a¢ liates to verify if and how a di¤erential in institutional constraints between origin and host countries
can shape organizational designs and nally a¤ect performance.
A third line of research is related to the exploration of the role of internal capital markets developed
by Business Groups for the allocation of nancial resources among competing investment projects.
Some preliminary evidence we have obtained on our data shows that the possibility to shift nancial
funds across activities and across countries mitigates the nancial pressures exerted on corporate
structures with respect to stand-alone rms, in line with previous ndings of the nance literature.
At the same time, however, we detect a complementarity across BGs between internal capital markets
and an enhanced borrowing capacity, probably due to a better reputation that acts as an intangible
collateral on credit markets. The latter seems to be particularly relevant in the years of nancial crisis
and as such constitutes a potential channel of competitiveness that is worth further investigation.
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Appendix A:
Corporate control and Business Groups from the Ownership Database (BvD)
Our two main sources of data are both compiled by Bureau Van Djik (BvD), a Belgian consulting
rm, and comprise the Ownership Database, from which we derive information on intra-group control
linkages, and the Orbis database, from which we retrieve companiesbalance sheet information.
The Ownership Database, in particular, includes information on over 30 million shareholder/subsidiary
links for companies worldwide. Information on proprietary linkages is collected directly from single
companies, from o¢ cial bodies when in charge, or from some national and international providers. In
Table A.1 we include a list of the information providers, with the indication of the countries/areas they
cover, as reported by the Ownership Database. In case of conicting information among providers
covering the same country/area, the Ownership Database is updated according to the latest available
report.
Among the international providers, Bureau van Djik enlists also Dun & Bradstreet, a data source
that has already been exploited in other academic works mentioned in this paper (Acemoglu, Johnson
and Mitton, 2009; Alfaro et al., 2011; Alfaro and Charlton, 2009).
Table A.1: Original sources of ownership linkages collected by Bureau Van Djik
CIBI Information, Inc. (Philippines), Creditreform (Bulgaria, Ukraine & Rep. of Macedonia) ,
Chamber of Commerce & Industry of Romania (Romania), CMIE (India), CFI Online (Ireland),
Creditreform-Interinfo (Hungary), Infocredit Group Ltd, (Cyprus & Middle East), CreditInform
(Norway), Creditreform Latvia (Latvia), Creditreform (Rep. of Macedonia), Informa Colombia SA
(Colombia), Contact database, Credinform (Russia & Kazakstan), Creditreform Austria (Austria),
Coface Slovenia (Slovenia), Dun & Bradstreet (USA, Canada, Latin America & Africa), DGIL
Consult (Nigeria), MarketLine, (previously Datamonitor), PT. Dataindo Inti Swakarsa (Indonesia),
DP Information Group (Singapore), Finar Enformasyon derecelendirme ve danismanlik hizmetleri
A.S (Turkey), Suomen Asiakastieto (Finland), Factset, Worldbox (Switzerland), Honyvem (Italy),
Creditreform Croatia (Croatia), Huaxia (China), Inforcredit Group (Cyprus), Informa del Peru
(Peru), ICAP (Greece), Informa (Spain), InfoCredit (Poland), Ibisworld (Australia), Jordans (UK,
Ireland), Patikimo Verslo Sistema (Lithuania), Krediidiinfo (Estonia), Købmandstandens
Oplysningsbureau (Denmark), KIS (Korea), LexisNexis (Netherlands), Bureau van Dijk
(Luxemburg), Creditreform Belgrade (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia & Montenegro), Coface MOPE
(Portugal), National Bank of Belgium (Belgium), Novcredit (Italy), Qatar Chamber of Commerce
and Industry (Qatar), Annual return (UK), Coface SCRL (France), Creditinfo Schufa GmbH (Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Iceland, Malta), SeeNews (Moldova, Albania, Georgia & Uzbekistan), Chinese
source, Statistics Canada (Canada), China Credit Information Service Ltd (Taiwan), Taiwan
Economic Journal (Taiwan), Teikoku Databank (Japan), Transunion (South Africa), UC (Sweden),
Verband der Vereine Creditreform (Germany), Worldbox (New Zealand, Hong Kong, Switzerland,
Monaco, Liechtenstein, Pakistan, Sri Lanka & Cuba)
The observation unit collected by the Ownership Database is the single link between a company
and each of its shareholders, with additional information on the total (direct and indirect) equity par-
ticipation when relevant. There are 7,707,728 companies with information on shareholding structures
in the original database. An algorithm provided by Bureau van Dijk allows to identify in principle the
ultimate owners of a single company.
However, since our purpose is to track the whole network of rms developed by each Business Group
as dened in Section 2.1 and model it as a hierarchical graph (see Figure 1), we have in principle to
depart from the complete shareholding structure of each company, in order to identify one ultimate
parent company, its set of a¢ liates and their relative distance within the hierarchy. To that extent, we
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slightly modify the original BvD algorithm in two ways: we reconcile conicting information that can
come from controlling and controlled subjects and we di¤erentiate between corporate and individual
ultimate owners, recovering a total of 1,790, 062 rms which belong to Business Groups (270,474
parents and 1,519,588 a¢ liates) according to our denition.
Conicting information deriving from controlling and controlled subjects can arise in presence
of cross-participations. In accordance with international standards we apply a threshold criterion
(>50.01%) for the denition of control on the basis of (direct and indirect) participation. The latter
is the methodology currently used across international institutions (OECD 2005; UNCTAD, 2009;
Eurostat, 2007), although it can lead to an overestimation of control in some bigger networks of a¢ li-
ates.39 That is, it is possible to end up with one a¢ liate controlled by more than one ultimate parent
company even after adopting a majority threshold. To solve that problem we can rely on information
o¢ cially provided by companiesconsolidated nancial accounts, when available. In particular, if we
nd that an a¢ liate is enlisted in more than one Business Group, we give priority to the ultimate par-
ent company that enlists that a¢ liate in its consolidated accounts. In case no consolidated accounts
are available we include the a¢ liate in the group where it is located at shorter control distance from
the parent.
On the other hand, as the standard algorithm reports every property linkage between a company
and each of its shareholders, it includes as members of potential business groups (as previously dened)
also a¢ liates that are directly controlled by individual (non-corporate) shareholders, and that are not
controlling subjects of any other company. While we have excluded these cases from our sample,
we include in our analysis those corporate networks that involve at least one intermediate property
linkage of a corporate nature.40
More in detail, our modied algorithm partitions all rms for which information on ownership is
available preliminarily in two groups:
a) a set of independent companies, that have as controlling shareholder individuals or a family or no
specic corporate entity, and that are not themselves controlling shareholders of any other company;
b) all the other companies for which information on property linkages is available; these companies
are either owned by a corporate controlling (immediate) shareholder or are themselves independent,
but act as controlling shareholders of other companies.
We exclude the set a) of independent rms from our sample, and use it as a control group for
further empirical analysis (see below Table A.2 for a description of this latter sample).
The algorithm then screens every rm belonging to group b) for the highest total (direct and
indirect) participation in the equity of each company, as provided by the Ownership Database. Once
it nds a corporate controlling entity A that sums up to more than 50.01% of control in a given
company B, company B is classied as an a¢ liate, while the same algorithm checks the shareholding
structure of company A. If the latter is in turn ultimately owned by another corporate entity C, the
process is repeated until a controlling company that has no corporate controlling shareholder is found.
39See Vitali, Glattfelder and Battistoni (2011) for an assessment of existing methodologies to attribute global corporate
control and their limits.
40 If for example an individual X directly controls a¢ liates A and B, we do not consider the X-A-B network as a business
group. Whereas, in the case of an individual X that indirectly controls a¢ liates C and D through a third company E,
we consider the E-C-D network as a Business Group, in which company E is the ultimate (corporate) owner.
36
The latter is considered as the ultimate parent company of a¢ liate companies A, B and C. In the case
of quoted companies, we consider as ultimate parent the highest company in the path of proprietary
linkages we can identify.
Having identied the set of a¢ liates and their parent, the algorithm then assigns a hierarchical
level within each Business Group, counting from the parent how many steps of intermediate property
are required for ultimate control. In case the same a¢ liate is encountered more than once in the same
path (due to cross-participations), we consider it as located on the closest level where we have nally
encountered it.
A limit of the Ownership Database of Bureau Van Dijk concerns the maximum number of control
levels that can be obtained after considering cross-participations: the algorithm allows to reach a
maximum of 10 levels for a maximum of 1,000 a¢ liates. However, in our data only 13 Business
Groups (that is 0.005% of our sample) exceed such limits. For these groups we can still obtain balance
sheet data for each a¢ liate and the headquarter, but we cannot retrieve the position of each a¢ liate
on the control chain. Hence, these 13 groups will be excluded from the empirical analysis involving
measurements of the hierarchical complexity.
As a result of our procedure to identify Business Groups, we can derive a control group that we
employ for a preliminary comparison of a¢ liates to Business Groups and non-a¢ liated rms along
di¤erent dimensions. From the above preliminary division in two groups of all rms for which we have
data in the Ownership Database, the group a) consists of 6,084,115 rms controlled by individuals or
families without control shares in any other company. Among them, however, for only 3,756,003 we
can retrieve at least one nancial account that we use for the calculation of premia in Table 2.
In Table A.2 we report some descriptive statistics of the control group collecting non-a¢ liated
rms confronted with the set of a¢ liates belonging to Business Groups.
Table A.2: A control group of non-a¢ liated rms, some descriptive statistics (US thousand
dollars)
Variables N. observations Mean Median St. dev. Min Max N. observations Mean Median St. dev. Min Max
Employment 2,952,128 13 4 51 1 14717 1,005,381 367 25 6225 1 1917456
Fixed assets 3,756,003 931 70 15016 1 4593066 1,005,381 109404 728 1812076 1 2.79E+08
Turnover (sales) 3,756,003 1464 279 4344 1 979128 1,005,381 119045 3493 1616124 1 3.57E+08
Non-affiliated firms* Affiliated firms
*A¢ liated rms are independent rms: controlling shareholders are individuals or families or no specic corporate
entity; they do not control a¢ liates.
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Appendix B:
Correspondence table between US input output table and NAICS 2002
classication of industries
Table B1: Correspondence table NAICS 2002 and US Input Output tables, source: US Bureau
of Economic Analysis
Industry description Input output codes 2002 NAICS codes
1 Farms 111CA 111, 112
2 Forestry, fishing, and related activities 113FF 113, 114, 115
3 Oil and gas extraction 211 211
4 Mining, except oil and gas 212 212
5 Support activities for mining 213 213
6 Utilities 22 22
7 Construction 23 23
8 Wood products 321 321
9 Nonmetallic mineral products 327 327
10 Primary metals 331 331
11 Fabricated metal products 332 332
12 Machinery 333 333
13 Computer and electronic products 334 334
14 Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 335 335
15 Motor vehicles, bodies and trailers, and parts 3361MV 3361, 3362, 3363
16 Other transportation equipment 3364OT 3364, 3365, 3366, 3369
17 Furniture and related products 337 337
18 Miscellaneous manufacturing 339 339
19 Food and beverage and tobacco products 311FT 311, 312
20 Textile mills and textile product mills 313TT 313, 314
21 Apparel and leather and allied products 315AL 315, 316
22 Paper products 322 322
23 Printing and related support activities 323 323
24 Petroleum and coal products 324 324
25 Chemical products 325 325
26 Plastics and rubber products 326 326
27 Wholesale trade 42 42
28 Retail trade 44RT 44, 45
29 Air transportation 481 481
30 Rail transportation 482 482
31 Water transportation 483 483
32 Truck transportation 484 484
33 Transit and ground passenger transportation 485 485
34 Pipeline transportation 486 486
35 Other transportation and support activities 487OS 487, 488, 492
36 Warehousing and storage 493 493
37 Publishing industries (includes software) 511 511, 516
38 Motion picture and sound recording industries 512 512
39 Broadcasting and telecommunications 513 515, 517
40 Information and data processing services 514 518, 519
41
Federal Reserve banks, credit intermediation, and
related activities 521CI 521, 522
42 Securities, commodity contracts, and investments 523 523
43 Insurance carriers and related activities 524 524
44 Funds, trusts, and other financial vehicles 525 525
45 Real estate 531 531
46
Rental and leasing services and lessors of intangible
assets 532RL 532, 533
47 Legal services 5411 5411
48 Computer systems design and related services 5415 5415
49
Miscellaneous professional, scientific, and technical
services 5412OP 5412-5414, 5416-5419
50 Management of companies and enterprises 55 55
51 Administrative and support services 561 561
52 Waste management and remediation services 562 562
53 Educational services 61 61
54 Ambulatory health care services 621 621
55 Hospitals and nursing and residential care facilities 622HO 622, 623
56 Social assistance 624 624
57
Performing arts, spectator sports, museums, and
related activities 711AS 711, 712
58 Amusements, gambling, and recreation industries 713 713
59 Accommodation 721 721
60 Food services and drinking places 722 722
61 Other services, except government 81 81
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Appendix C:
Sample properties of the Group Index of Complexity (GIC)
We had already argued in Section 3.2 how a simple counting of the number of a¢ liates can be a
poor proxy for the complexity of the control chain developed by a Business Group, where the hierarchy
design can involve di¤erent dimensions and groups with the same number of a¢ liates can eventually
come to display very di¤erent proprietary structures. Hence, we borrowed from graph theory a notion
of (probabilistic) entropy able to provide a synthetic measure for the similarity of hierarchical graphs
once assuming that Business Groupscontrol chains can be conveniently represented with a vertex
(here the headquarters) connected through edges (in our case control participations) to single nodes
(represented by a¢ liates) for the purpose of a coordinated management of economic activities. There-
after we argued that a change in the original node entropy was necessary to introduce an increasing
marginal complexity when a¢ liates were added at a farther distance from the headquarter, in order
to discount a high communication costs with the decision-making centre. Hence, we discussed how
this alteration modied consequently the properties of the original measure.
In this Appendix we want to show with further details how our Group Index of Complexity (GIC)
relates to both the number of a¢ liates (N) and the original node entropy (H(G)) borrowed from
graph theory exploiting our sample of Business Groups.
In Table C1 we report some descriptive statistics that already show how both the node entropy
in the second column and the GIC in the third column reproduce long right-tail distributions similar
to the more simple number of a¢ liates but with some di¤erences. Skewness is much higher in the
case of N , while H(G) and GIC start increasing rapidly only after the 83rd percentile of our sample,
di¤erently from the distribution of N which already has a right tail from the 75th percentile.
Table C.1: Comparison of distributions: number of a¢ liates (N), node entropy (H(G)) and
GIC
Statistics N H(G) GIC
Mean 5.62 0.18 0.35
standard deviation 32.62 0.43 1.02
Skewness 28.59 2.43 5.34
50th percentile 1 0 0
75th percentile 3 0 0
90th percentile 8 0.92 1.45
95th percentile 16 1 1.88
99th percentile 74 1.83 4.7
Maximum 1000* 3.27 19.07
*Maximum number of a¢ liates for which GICcan
be computed. 13 Business Groups are excluded from
computation for lack of information on hierarchical
levels.
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Since until the 57th percentile our sample is represented by Business Groups having only one a¢ l-
iate, both the node entropy and the GIC end up with null gures until that point of the distribution.
However, given the logarithmic weight of formulas 3 and 4, also groups that have few a¢ liates but
all positioned on a same control level (N = nl;whatever l) end up with a H(G) and a GIC that both
have null gures until the 83rd percentile.
The latter feature can be interpreted in terms of graph theory as a minimum complexity of the
hierarchical graph when nodes are all adjacent on a same level. From an economic point of view
it makes sense that Business Groups having a¢ liates all located at the same proprietary distance
from the headquarter are more easily coordinated in the management of their activities. Moreover,
if we assume that control runs univocally from the headquarter to each single a¢ liate, the cost of
maintaining a control chain with only one a¢ liate and the cost of it where more a¢ liates are however
located at the same level are virtually the same.
The previous is the reason why GIC (and node entropy) is not monotonic in the number of
a¢ liates, since the GIC (and the node entropy) is additive in proprietary levels but not in number of
a¢ liates. Groups with the same number of a¢ liates can arrange them in one or more levels and the
cost of exerting control through the network is higher in the latter case.
In Table C.2 we show however how sample distributions of GIC and N are signicantly correlated
when we report descriptive statistics of the rst by Business Groupssize classes
Table C.2: Descriptives of GIC by size classes of Business Groups
N. affiliates Frequency mean GIC median st dev max
1-5 86.70 0.16 0.00 0.51 6.97
6-20 9.49 1.21 0.99 1.47 18.87
21-50 2.29 2.09 1.51 2.16 18.83
51-200 1.21 3.29 2.69 2.90 18.71
201-500 0.23 5.20 4.27 3.88 18.96
>500 0.09 5.86 5.25 3.89 19.07
The average GIC and its median in the second column is indeed increasing from small groups that
have until ve a¢ liates to bigger groups that report more than 500 a¢ liates. Standard deviations
by size classes are also moderately increasing revealing that within each size class there is a certain
(increasing) degree of heterogeneity of hierarchical design, conrming that the GIC is more able to
catch that heterogeneity. Indeed, in the last column, where we report maximum GIC by size classes,
we do observe that even groups with only ten a¢ liates can show complex control chains comparable
to bigger groups because, recalling entropy properties introduced in Section 5, the GIC grows rapidly
when more a¢ liates are located on farther levels41.
41More precisely, given N number of a¢ liates and L number of levels for each Business Group, GIC reaches its
maximum when m  nm
N
= n  nn
N
, for each m;n 2 L, nm and nn a¢ liates on mth and nth level. That is, when the
group/graph is pyramidal.
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One would like to graphically compare N and GIC to observe how they behave along our sample
distributions. Given their extremely long right tails, we resort to mean excess plots of Figure C.1,
where graphs are the results of the following so called excess mean function (see Beirlant, Vynckier
and Teugels, 1996; Coles, 2001):
eF (u) = E (Y   u j Y > u) (C1)
where u 2 (xl; xr) where xl = inf fx : F (x) > 0g and xr = sup fx : F (x) < 1g.
Shortly, the mean excess plot gives back a transformation of the distribution such that it is repre-
sented as the excess of the consecutive sample means of a random variable Y with respect to a sequence
of threshold values u picked from the same domain of random variable Y such that the cumulative
distribution F (x) is dened on the interval (0; 1). More analytically, we can describe the mean excess
function as:
eF (u) =
1
F (u)
1Z
u
F (y)dy (C2)
with distributions of random variable Y on [0;1).
In our specic case, mean excess plots in Figure C.1 begin with the rst threshold value u di¤erent
from zero as present in our sample of Business Groups (1 in the case of N and :12 in the case of GIC).
The values at which the mean excess functions are maximum are 271 for random variable N and 2.89
for random variable GIC.
Figure C.1: A visual comparison of number of a¢ liates (N) and GIC distributions: mean
excess functions
In both cases, we observe that after the maximum of the mean excess function, the distributions
are steeply decreasing almost linearly. It means that in original (non-transformed) distributions they
both report a long right-tail that is very much similar from a statistical point of view. The observation
41
of a steeply decreasing right tail after a mean excess trasformation is usually considered itself as a
visual test to assume that the original distribution can be proxied by a Pareto. However, on the left
tail, number of a¢ liates and GIC behave somehow di¤erently since some points of discontinuity are
present for the GIC excess function but not for the Ns excess function Those discontinuities reveal
that at some lower measures of hierarchical complexity there is a high density of Business Groups, a
sample feature that was not observed when looking at Tables C.1 and C.2.
Finally, in Figure C.2 we report the quantile-quantile plot of GIC against N , in order to observe
graphically how they behave with respect to each other by percentiles. The graph shows that the
GIC has a smoother distribution especially. in the last quartile of the distribution. Thus, the GIC
is able to provide a continuous measure for organization of command chains that di¤erentiates more
when groups have a higher number of a¢ liates.
Figure C.2: A quantile-quantile plot of number of a¢ liates (N) vs GIC
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